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ARTICLE
DECIDING TO INTERVENE
Anna Spain*
ABSTRACT

Decisions about intervention into today's armed conflicts are
difficult, dangerous, and politically complicated. There are no
safe choices. Amid the climate of urgency and uncertainty in
which intervention decision-making occurs, international law
serves as a guide by providing rules about the legality of
intervention. These rules assert that, except for in cases of selfdefense, choices about when and how to intervene are to be made
by the United Nations Security Council. What the rules do not
provide, however, is effective guidance for the political choices
the Council makes, such as how to prioritize among competing
norms. When, for example, should the Council uphold the
sovereignty-based norm of nonintervention and when should it
authorize humanitarian intervention in alignment with the
emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect? Absent such
guidance, some hold that international law becomes an after-thefact justification for whatever decision is made or that it has no
influence whatsoever.
Rejecting this view, this Article proposes that international
law informs political choices about intervention through its
purposive intent. The idea of law's purposive intent-that rules
*

Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. The Author is grateful

to Curtis Bradley, Kristen Carpenter, Laura Dickinson, Vic Fleischer, Jean Galbraith,
Lakshman Guruswamy, Sarah Krakoff, Helen Norton, Saira Mohammed, Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Pierre Schlag, Ed Swaine, Beth Van Schaack and participants of the 106th
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting "New Voices" Panel and the
University of Berkeley Law & ASIL Human Rights Interest Group Workshop for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. The Author also thanks Chandler Griffith and Tim
Hole for their research assistance and Matt Zafiratos and Jane Thompson for their
outstanding research support.

847

848

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:3

and norms should be interpreted in light of their object and
purpose-is rooted in legal process theory. The Article further
posits that the purposive intent of international law is the
promotion of peace. Under this approach, any decision to
intervene must have as its overriding purpose the promotion of
long-term, positive peace. This thesis offers a novel contribution
to the literature on intervention by applying legal process theory
to an area of inquiry dominated by substantive legal
perspectives. More fundamentally, it presents a vision that
reshapes the paradigm of intervention from one that mistakenly
focuses on combating violence with force to one that takes
seriously the daunting task of building peace.
[T]he task of the internationallawyer over the next few years
is surely not to go on repeating the rhetoric of dead events
which no longer accord with reality, but to try to assist the
political leaders to identify what is the new consensus about
acceptable and unacceptable levels of intrusion.
- Dame Rosalyn Higgins'
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INTRODUCTION

To intervene or not to intervene? That is the preeminent
foreign policy question of our day. As the varied views about how
to respond to the recent conflict in Syria demonstrate, decisions
about intervention into armed conflicts are difficult, dangerous,
and politically complicated. 2 There are no safe choices. It is
challenging to make smart decisions about if and how
intervention can address crises amid a climate of urgency and
uncertainty.3 International law serves as a guide by providing
2. See, e.g., Steven A. Cook, Op-Ed., Striking Syria May Destroy It, WASH. POST,
Sept. 1, 2013, at B1 (arguing that the conflict in Syria has evolved past the point where
intervention would have been viable and that a U.S. limited response would cause
instability in the country for years to come); Richard N. Haass, America Must Respond to
the Atrocities in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/syria/america-must-respond-atrocities-syria/p3l268?cid=nlc-publictheworldthisweek-link3-20130823&sp-mid=42385357&sp-rid=YW5uYS5zcGFpbkBjb2
xvcmFkby5lZHUS1 (arguing that America must intervene in order to maintain a strong
norm against the use of chemical weapons and recommending two strategies for doing so
that fall short of full military-on-the-ground intervention); Ed Husain, Op-Ed., Why

Western

Intervention in

Syria

Will

Leave

Chaos,

CNN

(Aug.

30,

2013),

http://www.cnn.comI20l3/08/28/opinion/syria-husain-opinion/index.html (arguing that the
situation in'Syria is "not America's problem" and that military intervention in Syria
would back the Assad government into a corner, increasing the risk of further chemical
attacks and arguing that a post-Assad Syria would lead to greater instability in Syria);
Stewart M. Patrick, MLK, Obama,and the Audacity of Intervention in Syria, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 26, 2013), http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2013/08/26/mlk-obamaand-the-audacity-of-intervention-in-syria?cid=nlc-public-theworld this_week-link5-2013

0830&sp-mid=42442367&sp-rid=YW5uYS5zcGFpbkBjb2xvcmFkby5lZHUS1
(arguing
that the use of chemical weapons in Syria and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
create a situation where "ethical realism" obligates President Obama to intervene in

Syria).
3.
See generally ALEX MINTZ & KARL DEROUEN JR., UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN
POLICY DECISION MAKING (2010); JONATHAN M. ROBERTS, DECISION-MAKING DURING
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4
rules about the legality of intervention and the use of force.
Under the U.N. Charter, all nations are prohibited from using
force, except in self-defense. 5 Furthermore, the Charter places
the authority to make decisions about intervention with the
6
United Nations Security Council (UNSC or Council).
Despite these rules, there is significant scholarly debate
about the legality of intervention under international law.7 One

INTERNATIONAL CRISES 231 (1988) ("[International law] is not, however, essentially
geared to deal with crises that arise from situations in which the major policy goals and
aspirations of major powers are in conflict."); YAACOV Y.I. VERTZBERGER, RISK TAKING
AND DECISION MAKING: FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS (1998). A
recollection by a survivor of the Rwandan genocide provides important context:
[The militiamen] had arrived in a great number of cars. We trembled when we
saw all this.... My wife could not run because she was pregnant and my
children were small .... As I was running, I fell in a ditch .... I stayed there,
trembling in fear .... In the evening, when the militiamen had gone, I left the
ditch. I couldn't find the way because there were bodies everywhere.
AFRICAN RIGHTS, RESISTING GENOCIDE: BISESERO, APRIL-JUNE 1994, at 35-36 (1998).
4.
This Article uses the term "intervention" to refer to measures under the U.N.
Charter Chapters VI and VII, including the use of force. Intervention is defined in Part II.
See HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 281 ("When one is dealing with military intervention in the
context of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, one is really simply dealing with the lawful and
unlawful use of force.").
5.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."); id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security."); see IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 252-56 (1963) (describing the
effect that different international laws have on the right to use force in self-defense);
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 788, 805 para. 42 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the
constraints of proportionality and necessity).
6.
U.N. Charter arts. 41-42; id. art. 39 (providing procedural guidance to the
UNSC by requiring the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and... make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 [peaceful measures] and 42
[forceful measures], to maintain or restore international peace and security"). But see
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 336-37 (2011) ('"The issue of abuse
of the Council's competence (or action ultra vires) can be raised when the Council adopts a
decision inimical to the aims stated in the Charter or bypassing the 'due process'
requirements, especially through any bargain behind the decision making which is alien
to the Charter purposes.").
7.
See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 122-23 (2010) ("No advance in the art of legal drafting can bridge
the enormous gulf that divides the international community over what constitutes the
acceptable use of force .. "); Ian Hurd, Is HumanitarianIntervention Legal?: The Rule of
Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 293, 293 (2011) ('The debate
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of the central inquiries is whether nations should be permitted to
use force to engage in humanitarian intervention. The
conventional view among scholars mirrors the legal framework
provided for in the U.N. Charter-absent self-defense,
interventions involving the use of force are not permissible under
international law unless authorized by the UNSC. 8 However, a
contrasting view is emerging that the unauthorized use of force is
sometimes necessary to prevent genocide or to alleviate
humanitarian crises that cause widespread human suffering. 9
suggests that humanitarian intervention is either legal or illegal depending on one's
understanding of how international law is constructed, changed, and represented. Since
these questions cannot be answered definitively, the uncertainty remains fundamental,
and the legality of humanitarian intervention is essentially indeterminate."); see also
William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of InternalArmed Conflict: The European Court
of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 741, 743-44 (2005) (discussing
intervention through the lenses of human rights law and international humanitarian
law); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 701-02 (2004)
(discussing intervention in regards to national security); Ian Brownlie, InternationalLaw
and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 712, 718-28 (1958) (discussing
intervention in regards to international criminal law).
8.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 265 (interpreting the U.N. Charter as
prohibiting unauthorized use of force except in cases of self-defense); Michael Bothe,
Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 227, 228, 230-31
(2003) (noting that "any specific use of force can be lawful only if it can be based on an
exception to [the prohibition of the use of force]," which includes both self-defense and
authorization by the UNSC); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63
U. PITr. L. REV. 889, 899-901 (2002) (arguing against intervention but recognizing an
exception when a state cannot control a nonstate actor operating within its territory);
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 19,
20-23 (forthcoming) (finding that one limitation under international law is that force may
not be used to target civilians and only a state's armed forces or persons taking direct part
in hostilities may be targeted); see also Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on
UnauthorizedHumanitarianIntervention, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1326-27 (2010) (arguing
that "unauthorized humanitarian interventions-regardless of their merits-are
violations of the [United Nations] Charter and customary international law"); Colum
Lynch & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Efforts to Build Legal Case for Strikes Run into Questions,
WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013, at A10 (showing that the "doctrine of humanitarian
intervention could set a bad precedent that would be more likely to be used by other
countries like Russia and China or some African countries.., in attacking their enemies"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
9.
See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the
'Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2289 (2003) (accepting the "basic premise that
there are many situations in which it is justifiable and beneficial for the U.S. and other
actors to seek to promote human rights and the rule of law abroad, and that at times even
military interventions are a necessary and justifiable part of this effort"); Beth Van
Schaack, "The Grass That Gets Trampled When Elephants Fight" Will the Codification of
the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 327, 385-87
(2010) (supporting humanitarian intervention in instances where egregious acts are being
committed against women); see also Austin Glassman, The Evolution of the Prohibitionon
the Use of Force and Its Conflict with Human Rights Protection: Balancing Equally
Forceful Jus Cogens Norms, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 345, 369-70 (2011)
(supporting an increased use of force in interventions in order to protect human rights);
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This view finds support in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine,
which states that when a state fails to protect its own people
from certain harms, the rights afforded to it by the doctrine of
sovereignty give way to the international community's
responsibility to protect.10 Although these views fail to persuade
all,11 they persist and so does the debate about the legality of
humanitarian intervention.
The purpose of this Article is to examine international law's
influence in determining whether intervention ought to take
place, even if it is legally permissible. To do this, the Article
evaluates international law's role in informing, and ultimately
improving, decisions about intervention as determined by the one
body authorized to make them, the U.N. Security Council.
Following an international legal process theory perspective, the
Article identifies critical challenges that Council decision-makers
face and considers how international law can provide guidance in
this context. For example, Council diplomats have trouble
determining which norm they ought to prioritize when they make
Jasmeet Gulati & Ivan Khosa, HumanitarianIntervention: To Protect State Sovereignty,
41 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 397, 414-15 (2013) (arguing that intervention for human
rights is intervention for preservation of state sovereignty because the protection of a
state's population is an implicit responsibility of the state).
10.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT 11-17 paras. 2.1-2.31 (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
ICISS%2OReport.pdf; JAMES PATrISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? 2 (2010) ("Even those who are
deeply suspicious of armed humanitarian intervention and deeply skeptical about its
prospects of success may still admit that it might, in theory, be justified when a
humanitarian crisis is sufficiently serious."); Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian
Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1689-90 (2000) ("When the
Security Council fails to act to stop a continuing humanitarian crisis, these two basic
pillars of the post-World War II legal order come into dramatic conflict."); Monica Hakimi,
State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341, 354-55 (2010) (examining when
states have obligations under international human rights to protect people from abuses
committed by third parties); Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Q of Sovereignty, 20
EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 521 (2009) (arguing that a state's treatment of its internal
constituents in accordance with human rights should be a condition of its external
sovereignty).
11.
See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 8 (2006) ("We need to
remember what it means to say that compliance with international law 'legitimates.' It
means, of course, that killing, maiming, humiliating, wounding people is legally
privileged, authorized, permitted, and justified."); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD
WORLD RESISTANCE 97-98 (2003) (arguing that every intervention "mechanically
reproduces unjust capitalistic relations between the West and the Third World"); Martti
Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 460-63
(1996) (claiming that the Council is "notorious[ly]" selective when deciding to use force);
Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOCY' INT'L L. PROC. 31, 35-37 (2000) (arguing
that third world states remain marginal and find themselves at the mercy of Western
capital).
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choices about intervention. Substantive legal rules about the
legality of intervention are not helpful here because they are
often based on conflicting norms. On the one hand, the U.N.
Charter upholds the principle of nonintervention secured by "the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."' 2 On the
other hand, sovereignty should not recuse a state from protecting
its people from an array of harms including atrocities, armed
13
conflict, or humanitarian disasters.
Furthermore, the Council seeks guidance about why it
should authorize intervention. As its resolutions regarding Libya
14
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) demonstrate,
the Council has moved beyond the traditional Article 39 grounds
for intervention in its recent consideration of humanitarian
imperatives. 5 With fifteen state Members, five of which are
permanent Members that enjoy the right to veto a substantive
decision, reaching consensus about using force against a
sovereign nation is a difficult endeavor.' 6 What the Council
12.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 ('The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members."); see J.H. LEURDIJK, INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 57 (1986) (defining the norm of nonintervention and arguing
that it is a legal principle that informs political practice); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J.
THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 67-74
(1956) (articulating a standard of equality among nation-states in the intervention
context); Tom J. Farer, A Paradigmof Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 316-19 (Lori Fisler Damrosch
ed., 1993) (describing the rights that a nation-state has in the U.N. with respect to
intervention); see also U.N. Charter art. 51; supra note 5.
13.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 10, at 1117 paras. 2.1-2.31 (redefining sovereignty as including the responsibility of a nation to
protect its population and allowing a limitation on its sovereign right to be free from
external intervention if it fails to do so).
14.
The UNSC has traditionally reserved authorizing interventions for situations
that constitute a threat to or breach of the peace. However, its recent practice has
departed from this tradition (e.g., UNSC-authorized intervention into Libya to protect
civilians "by all necessary means"; the recently UNSC-created Intervention Brigade in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo). S.C. Res. 1973, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17,
2011) (Libya) ("Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General,
acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under threat of attack ....");S.C. Res. 1493, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003)
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) (authorizing the use of "all necessary steps to prevent
further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law"). Furthermore,
unauthorized interventions (e.g., Kosovo) and those conducted against nonstate actors
inside another nation's territory in the name of self-defense (e.g., Afghanistan) have
complicated the rules. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (Afghanistan);
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (Kosovo).
15.

INGER OSTERDAHL,

THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION

BY THE

SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER § 2.2.1, at 18-21 (1998).
16.
MICHAEL J. MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND: THE GROWTH OF UN DECISION
MAKING ON CONFLICT AND POSTCONFLICT ISSUES AFTER THE COLD WAR 33-37 (2006)

854

HO USTON LAW REVIEW

[51:3

needs, and what substantive legal rules fail to provide, is a clear
basis for the purpose of intervention. Without a shared
understanding about why intervention should take place, it
becomes very difficult for the Council to reach consensus about
whether or not to intervene. 7
In response, this Article proposes that international law
guides choices about intervention by providing purposive
intent. 18 The idea of law's purposive intent-that rules and
norms should be interpreted in light of their object and purposeis rooted in legal process theory and enjoys legitimate recognition
as a guide for decision-making in other areas of law. 19
This Article further posits, based on legal history and legal
theory, that the purposive intent of international law is the
promotion of peace. 20 Under this approach, any decision to
(discussing how "decisions under Chapter VII take precedence over other sources of
international law" and how the Council also has the authority to "require states to take
actions that would otherwise be prohibited by other treaties").
17.
See, e.g., JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 5 (2006) ("I]hat
goals, if any, justify military interventions?").
18.
This Article builds upon my earlier work describing the decision-making
processes of the UNSC, their challenges, and procedural solutions. See Anna Spain, The
U.N. Security Council's Duty to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 320 (2013) (arguing
that the Council has a duty to affirmatively decide whether or not to address
international crises that constitute threats to or breaches of the peace).
19.
The concept of purposive intent has its foundation in legal process theory. See
AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW xiii (Sari Bashi trans., 2005)
("Purposive interpretation begins with the idea that interpretation is about pinpointing
the legal meaning of a text along the spectrum of its semantic meanings."); 1 ABRAM
CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS:
MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE x-xii (1968) (discussing the "allocation of
decision-making competence"); THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 268-75 (1993) (showing that international
law provides a framework on what type of activity is acceptable and what type of activity
is unacceptable); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1496-98 (1987) ("[I]nterpretation itself inevitably involves the 'creation' of
meaning from the interaction of the text, historical context, and evolutive context.");
Steven Graines & Justin Wyatt, The Rehnquist Court, Legal Process Theory, and
McCleskey v. Kemp, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (2000) ('The primary features of legal-process
theory are (1) the purposiveness of law and the centrality of process, (2) the commitment
to neutrality and neutral principles, and (3) the principle of institutional settlement or
institutional competence."); Mary Ellen O'Connell, New InternationalLegal Process, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 338 (1999) (stating that NILP considers what law is "for" and the
values of the system and the "procedures that decision makers should follow in reaching
them").
20.
U.N. Charter art. 1 ('To maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace ..
"); Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 171-72 (July 20) (holding that the main purpose of the
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intervene must align with the aim of promoting peace. Hans
Kelsen's theory of the Grundnorm, which posits that all legal
systems are grounded in one basic norm that serves to unify all
other norms, provides a useful conceptual framework for
understanding the promotion of peace as the purpose of
21
international law.
The purposive intent thesis is not without its challenges, and
this Article considers two. First, if the Council is going to
approach decisions about intervention such that they align with
the aim of promoting peace, it needs to define peace in order to
make it a useful concept for organizing and guiding decisions
about intervention. Second, the purposive intent approach will
require reforming how decisions about intervention are made at
the Council, as well as who gets to make them. This Article
examines these challenges and offers several suggestions about
how to address them.
In considering how international law can improve UNSC
decision-making about intervention through purposive intent,
this Article makes several important contributions to the existing
literature on intervention and the use of force. First, it offers
important insights about how the UNSC uses international law
to inform its choices about intervention and the challenges it
faces therein. In doing so, this Article answers the call for
international legal scholarship that engages the role of norms
United Nations is to promote a peaceful settlement); id. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge
Fitzmaurice); LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 296 (3d ed. 1969)
(providing examples of limiting intervention to promote peace); OSTERDAHL, supra note
15, § 2.2.2, at 25 ("As to the question of the relative importance of the goal of maintaining
or restoring international peace and security (Article 1(1)) and the goal of encouraging
respect for human rights (Article 1(3)) respectively, to the extent that the two can be
separated, there is no doubt that the former was considered to be superior to the latter
when the Charter was drafted.").
21.
See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115-16, 121-22
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1961) (1945) [hereinafter KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY] (identifying
the theory of a Grundnorm, or basic norm, that provides the basis for a legal system
through which other laws are legitimized and interpreted and which, in international law,
could serve as superior to the normative interests of individual states); HANS KELSEN,
LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES,
1940-41, at 27 (1942) [hereinafter KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE]; HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW 31 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 2006) (1967) [hereinafter KELSEN, PURE
THEORY] ("An 'order' is a system of norms whose unity is constituted by the fact that they
all have the same reason for their validity; and the reason for the validity of a normative
order is a basic norm ... from which the validity of all norms of the order are derived.").
But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 292-93 nn. 1-4 (2d ed. 1994) (1964) (arguing
against Kelsen's Grundnorm on several grounds); Joseph Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic
Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94, 99 (1974) (arguing that Kelsen's theory "cannot solve the
problem of identity and unity of legal systems" and that "[tihere is nothing in the theory
to prevent two legal systems from applying to the same territory").
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and international legal process. 22 Second, this Article recognizes
the Council's dysfunctional practices and takes seriously the task
of addressing them with realistic, pragmatic solutions. 23 Third,
this Article's normative focus on the promotion of peace advances
the view that the paradigm of intervention should be reformed
from one that focuses on combating violence with force to one
that aims to build a positive, long-term peace. 24 Finally, this

22.
There is a growing recognition of the need for international legal scholarship
that examines the role of norms and international legal process. See MIREILLE DELMASMARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 115-28 (Naomi Norberg trans., 2009) (examining the
interactions between the speed of decision-making and the changing of norms over time);
Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379, 379-80
(1999) (arguing that norms are more likely to be adopted when the initiator of the norm
enjoys legitimacy); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2634, 2649 (1997) (urging scholars to attempt a "thick" description of
transnational legal process); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke TransitionalJustice:
A Pluralist Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2010) (looking at norm-based
decision-making in the context of recovery from incidents of mass violence, and noting
that "[flor legal institutions to successfully perform an expressive function, the
community whose norms are at issue must trust those who aim to alter these norms, and
individuals with authority in the message receiving communities must participate in the
process of clarifying and establishing new social norms"); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral
Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 51, 71-72 (2010) (proposing that "rather
than assuming an international norm and asking how that norm can be enforced... [one
instead should ask] how international human rights regimes could pay more attention to
the social situations that give or deny its norms social meaning"); see also TOM R. TYLER
ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 75 (1997) (noting criticism by social-justice
researchers "about the completeness of outcome-oriented justice models" and advocating
for an "expanded model recognizes that people are concerned about how decisions are
made as well as about what those decisions are"); Maggi Carfield, ParticipatoryLaw and
Development: Remapping the Locus of Authority, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 739, 743 (2011)
(suggesting the important question regarding normative decision-making in the law and
development context is "[i]n what ways, if any, does a community want to change the
rules it operates by, and how can external actors assist in that process?"); Amy J. Cohen,
Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 511, 517 (2009)
(examining within law and development "an effort to enable ordinary citizens to instill
within themselves normative desires for particular configurations of modern legal rules,
processes, and institutions").
23.
See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Sovereignty, the Security Council and the Use of Force,
in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 111, 117 (Michael
Bothe, Mary Ellen O'Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005) ("There have been many
academic proposals to abolish (or appreciably reduce) the veto power. Such proposals
remain an academic-and entirely moot-exercise. There is no indication whatever that
the five permanent members might be willing to consider divesting themselves of the veto
power."); C. Eduardo Vargas Toro, UN Security Council Reform: UnrealisticProposals
2008),
Viable
Reform
Options, Global
Policy
Forum
(Nov.
25,
and
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41138.html.
24.
See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P, in
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: INTERROGATING THEORY
AND PRACTICE 71, 71 (Philip Cunliffe ed., 2011) (arguing that the current paradigm of
military intervention does not promote peace); A.P.V. Rogers, HumanitarianIntervention
and International Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 725, 735-36 (2004) (arguing that
humanitarian intervention should be a last resort in achieving peace).
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Article seeks to provide meaningful analysis of intervention that
examines how the Security Council's choices are informed not
25
just by law but also through law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines the concept of
intervention, describes the legal rules governing its use, and
traces its evolution from peacekeeping to humanitarian
intervention. Part III describes the challenges that decisionmakers at the Security Council face when making choices about
intervention as a norm conflict in international law and considers
how such conflicts can be addressed. Part IV asserts the central
claim of this Article, that international law's purposive intent can
and should guide decisions about intervention. It then describes
the meaning of purposive intent and provides support for the
view that the purposive intent of international law is the
promotion of peace. The Article concludes in Part V by
identifying and addressing two challenges that arise from
adopting the purposive intent view.
II. THE MEANING OF INTERVENTION
A. Defining Intervention
Defining intervention is a complex endeavor, as "there is no
satisfactory agreement among jurists as to the meaning and
content of intervention in international law. '"26 Intervention
implies a breach of a nation's sovereignty, premised on the
definition of the norm of nonintervention, 27 which the United
States officially adopted in 1933 at the Seventh International
Conference of American States.28 As a legal matter, it is

Vera Gowland-Debbas, The Security Council and Issues of Responsibility Under
25.
International Law, in 353 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 185, 199, 201 (2011) ("Any meaningful analysis of
Chapter VII today therefore requires going beyond the framework of Charter legality to
examine the role of the Security Council within the broader international legal system.
The functions which it plays within that order-and by function we mean not only the
way it operates, but also the tasks it performs by law and through law ....").
See THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 12, at 67; Rogers, supra note 24, at 727-36
26.
(arguing that humanitarian intervention should be a last resort in achieving peace).
See LEURDIJK, supra note 12, at 57 ('The norm of non-intervention in the internal
27.
affairs of other States can be derived from the conception of the international system as
essentially an inter-State order.'). See generally Farer, supra note 12, at 316-18.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 8,Dec. 26, 1933, 49
28.
Stat. 3097, 3100; see also Organization of American States [OAS], Res. No. 1, at 1, OAS Doc.
8189 (May 17, 1989); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
1,
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX),
7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965) ("No State [or group of States] has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State.').
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29
important to distinguish intervention from the use of force.
Sanctions, for example, constitute an "intervention against a
state's domestic jurisdiction" even though they do not violate a
30
state's territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty.
Articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter categorize the
intervention options for taking "Action with Respect to Threats to
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." 31 The
former lists options that do not involve the use of force (sanctions
and interruption of diplomatic relations), 32 and the latter covers
the use of force (military intervention, blockades, and
demonstrations). 33 Military intervention denotes "coercive
military intrusion into the internal or foreign affairs of another
state."34 Humanitarian intervention is the use of force by one or
more states against another state for the purpose of protecting
35
people from human rights abuses and overwhelming suffering.
U.N. Peacekeeping operations and other operations providing
humanitarian assistance are sometimes erroneously referred to
as intervention, but the distinction is that they take place with
UNSC authorization after consultation with the state in
question, and therefore do not violate a state's domestic
36
jurisdiction.
29. Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 29, 40 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984) [hereinafter Higgins, Intervention and
International Law] (cautioning against conflating the terms aggression and intervention
as a legal matter); id. at 38 ("One thus has constantly the problem of identifying the
reality, and measuring it against the rhetoric."); see also Rosalyn Higgins, Internal War
and InternationalLaw, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 81, 90-93

(Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1971) (emphasizing that humanitarian efforts
during armed conflict "are not to be regarded as unfriendly acts").
30.
HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 274.
31.
U.N. Charter ch. VII.
32.
Id. art. 41.
33.
Id. art. 42.
34.
VERTZBERGER, supra note 3, at 3. See generally Philip Windsor, Superpower
Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 29, at 45, 62-63.
35.

See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 742-45 (7th ed.

2008) ("A state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and excessively cruel
treatment of those within its power, whether nationals or not, was regarded as having
made itself liable to action by any state which was prepared to intervene."); see also
DANIEL THURER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, CONTEXT 290

(2011) (stating that "if a State is not able or not willing to protect its people, international
intervention must be an option in cases of genocide" and crimes against humanity, state
collapse, mass starvation and civil war); Hakimi, supra note 10, at 346-48, 356-60
(discussing state obligation to protect internal populations arising in the context of
international human rights).
36.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 770, T 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (Aug. 13, 1992) (requesting
that Member States assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance in parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina); see also ROBERT NALBANDOV, FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS IN
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 9-24 (2009) (describing theories of third-party intervention); Nancy D.

Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian Concerns
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This Article examines how international law informs the
U.N. Security Council's choices about intervention. Given this
focus, the Article primarily considers interventions involving the
use of military force, as well as peacekeeping, while recognizing
37
that there are additional approaches.
The legality of intervention is governed by international
legal rules regarding the use of force by states, which are codified
in treaties, notably the U.N. Charter, and in international
customary law. 38 The Charter prohibits nations from engaging in
the use of force, except in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 and
subject to the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and
immediacy. 39 One question that has arisen is whether or not the
self-defense exception authorizes a nation to use force in defense
of others. 40 Representing Yugoslavia in its application before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Ian Brownlie argued that
the right to use force pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
does not cover the defense of others, even to provide
humanitarian protection. 41 Furthermore, if a nation threatens to
Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 203-04 (1993) ("[C]onsent of

the target country 'should' be obtained before providing humanitarian assistance.").
37.

See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION:

CHANGING

BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE 52-54 (2003); LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE
RESORT TO FORCE 5-39 (2010) (offering a general legal framework for the rules ofjus ad
bellum); THOMAS G. WEISS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: IDEAS IN ACTION (2007);

Higgins, Intervention and InternationalLaw, supra note 29, at 30 (defining the spectrum
of intervention); Natalino Ronzitti, The Current Status of Legal Principles Prohibitingthe
Use of Force and Legal Justificationsof the Use of Force, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY:
THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra note 23, at 91, 91-104; Quincy Wright,
Non-Military Intervention, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF LEO GROSS 5, 8-9 (Karl Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1968).
38.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 113 ("By reason of the universality of the
[United Nations] it is probable that the principles of [Article 2.4] constitute general
international law. In any case the difference between [Article 2.4] and 'general
international law' is the merest technicality. The Charter [together with the KelloggBriand Pact] ... form[s] the essential juridical basis of the world legal order and of world
peace." (footnotes omitted)).
39.
U.N. Charter art. 51; supra note 5.
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the
40.
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 33-34 (2011) (statement of Eric Holder, Att'y Gen. of the United
States) ("[L]et me make something very clear. The operation in which Osama bin Laden
was killed was lawful.... [It] was justified as an act of national self-defense.... [Bin
Laden was] a lawful military target. And the operation was conducted in a way that is
consistent with our law, with our values."); see also Brownlie, supra note 7, at 731-32
('Military action across a frontier to suppress armed bands, which the territorial
sovereign is unable or unwilling to suppress, has been explained in terms of legitimate
self-defence on a limited number of occasions in the present century."); Oscar Schachter,
The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INTL L. 645, 648 (1984) (claiming that a
rule against unilateral force has been prevalent since the inception of the United Nations
Charter, except when in self-defense).
41.
See Case Concerning Legality of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, 34,
36-38 (May 10, 1999, 10 AM), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4473.pdf ("Humanitarian
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use force, that threat is deemed unlawful if the use of force itself
42
would be unlawful.
The U.N. Charter also provides that, absent self-defense,
only the UNSC has the authority to permit the use of force in
43
order to "maintain or restore international peace and security."
Article 2.7 of the U.N. Charter further clarifies that
[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
44
under Chapter VII.

The Charter-based rules about the use of force support the
conclusion that, absent self-defense or UNSC authorization,
45
nations are not permitted to use force under international law.
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty issued a report entitled The
Responsibility to Protect, which defined sovereignty as having
an element of responsibility wherein a state must protect its
people and articulated a normative legal framework for
intervention with humanitarian dimensions. 46 This prompted
significant debate about the legality of unauthorized
humanitarian intervention. Proponents argue that it enjoys
widespread acceptance and even state practice, thus becoming

intervention... has no legal authenticity whatsoever.'); Legality of the Use of Force,
(Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Application of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1999 L.C.J. 105 (Apr.
29). The ICJ declined to hear the case on the grounds that it lacked compulsory jurisdiction
under Article 36.2 of the ICJ Statute on the basis that Yugoslavia had not accepted jurisdiction
prior to the events in question.
42.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95,
246 (July 8). ('The notions of 'threat' and 'use' of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal-for
whatever reason-the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.").
43. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").
44. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
45.
See id. arts. 52-53 (holding that, generally, no enforcement action should take place
without the authorization of the Security Council); S.C. Res. 1199, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1160, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
46.
See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 10, at 11-17
paras. 2.1-2.31 (redefining sovereignty as including the responsibility of a nation to protect its
population and imposing limits on its sovereign right to be free from external intervention if it
fails to do so).
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an emerging norm.4 7 However, as international legal scholars
Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro explain,
Some argue that international law provides for a
"responsibility to protect" that allows states to intervene
during humanitarian disasters, without Security Council
authorization. They point to NATO's 1999 intervention in
Kosovo. But in 2009 the United Nations secretary general,
Ban Ki-moon, rejected this view, finding that "the
responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces,
the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the
use of force except in conformity with the Charter," a
48
position he affirmed on Tuesday.
This helps to explain the prevailing view among
international legal scholars that unauthorized interventions,
even for humanitarian purposes, are illegal under international
law.

49

47.
See FINNEMORE, supra note 37, at 54 (arguing that sovereignty no longer trumps
humanitarian action); TAYLOR B. SEYBOLT, HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE 1-15 (2007) (claiming that the modern international
system holds that sovereign states have a right to nonintervention but that humanitarian
intervention has been gaining widespread acceptance); Peters, supra note 10, at 543 (arguing
that sovereignty is no longer a first principle of international law but a second-order norm that
derives its meaning from overriding priorities of protecting human rights and interests); Nina
Schou, Instances of Human Rights Regimes, in DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF
TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 209, 219-28 (Thomas M. Franck ed.,
2000); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use ofForce: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INTL L. 1,
6 (1999) (suggesting that while unauthorized humanitarian interventions constitute violations
of international law, there are other considerations that should affect decisions about
intervention); Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the InternationalRule
of Law?, 22 EuR. J. INT'L. L. 315, 325 (2011) (opining that states are "trustees for the people
committed to their care).
48.
Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn't Optional,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2013, at A23.
49.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 342 ("[imt is extremely doubtful if this form of
intervention has survived the express condemnations of intervention which have occurred
in recent times or the general prohibition of resort to force to be found in the United
Nations Charter." (footnotes omitted)); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 128 (1991) ("Neither human rights, democracy or selfdetermination are acceptable legal grounds for waging war, nor for that matter, are
traditional just war causes or righting of wrongs."); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of
"Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 824-25 (1999) (finding that
humanitarian intervention is prohibited unless authorized by the Security Council, but
that a single permanent Member could prevent authorization); Mary Ellen O'Connell, The
UN, NATO, and InternationalLaw After Kosovo, 22 HUM.RTS. Q. 57, 70 (2000) (finding
that there is no right under customary international law or any treaty permitting a state
to undertake a humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization); W.
Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and Arresting Mass
Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 57, 79 (2008) ("[N]o major participating government
relied exclusively or primarily on some sort of theory of humanitarian intervention, or on
an international responsibility to act to arrest mass killing."); THORER, supra note 35, at
52-53 ("Human beings deserve the same protection, regardless of whether they are
affected by a battle taking place within one country or across borders. That is why the
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B. The Evolution of Intervention:From Peacekeeping to
HumanitarianIntervention
For much of the post-WWII and Cold War era, the UNSC
authorized forceful intervention to address acts of aggression
and threats to and breaches of international peace and security
pursuant to Article 39 of the Charter. 50 Then, in the late 1980s,
the basis for intervention began to include humanitarian
concerns. 5 1 The shift started with the expansion of peacekeeping
operations in response to new circumstances presented by
Security Council and other international bodies, when demanding respect for
international humanitarian law, pay no heed to the legal classification of a conflict."); see
also OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 497-511 (Christopher Sutcliffe trans., 2010)

(examining the illegality of humanitarian intervention in international law both explicitly
and implicitly).
50. U.N. Charter art. 39 ('The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
51.
S.C. Res. 2098,
9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2098 (Mar. 28, 2013) (creating the
"Intervention Brigade"); id. 12, ("Authorizes MONUSCO, through its military component,
in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 11 above, to take all necessary measures
to perform the following tasks, through its regular forces and its Intervention Brigade as
appropriate.... ); S.C. Res. 2085,
9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012) (Mali)
("Decides to authorize the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in
Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year, which shall take all necessary measures, in
compliance with applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law and in
full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Mali to carry out the
following tasks .... .'); S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, 4 ("Authorizes Member States that
have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary
measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack.
); S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769
(July 31, 2007) (peacekeeping force authorized); S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug.
31, 2006) (Sudan) (peacekeeping force authorized but lacked consent); S.C. Res. 1701, U.N.
Doc. SIRES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006) (Israel/Lebanon); S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(June 8, 2004) (Iraq I); S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004) (Burundi);
S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004) (C6te d'Ivoire); S.C. Res. 1497, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003) (Liberia); S.C. Res. 1493, supra note 14 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo); S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (East Timor);
S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N.
Doc. SIRES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 14 (Kosovo); S.C.
Res. 1127, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1127 (Aug. 28, 1997) (Angola); S.C. Res. 1101, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/ll01 (Mar. 28, 1997) (Albania); S.C. Res. 1080, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1080 (Nov. 15, 1996)
(Great Lakes region, Zaire); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doec. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994) (Haiti); S.C.
Res. 929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993) (Bosnia and Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(Dec. 3, 1992) (Somalia); S.C. Res. 717, U.N. Doc. S/RES/717 (Oct. 16, 1991) (Cambodia);
S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. SIRES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (Iraq/Kurds); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (Iraq/Kuwait); see also MICAH ZENKO, BETWEEN THREATS AND
WAR: U.S. DISCRETE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 2 (2010) (finding
that the United States is the dominant international actor and has increasingly used limited
force against other states or nonstate actors to achieve policy goals).
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noninternational armed conflicts, 52 such as the need to provide
enforcement for regional peace agreements in Afghanistan,
Southern Africa, Central America, and Cambodia.5 3 These
operations began to consider how to protect civilian populations
from famine, disease, and atrocities that occurred during and
sometimes as a result of armed conflict.
The term "humanitarian intervention" emerged to give a
name to the use of force inside a sovereign nation for
humanitarian purposes, thus extending beyond Article 39
grounds. It has been defined variously as "[e]mploying military
means for humanitarian ends" 54 and as "the external use of
55
force to stop genocide or widespread human rights abuse."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace, which
identified preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
furthered the
and peacebuilding as tools for addressing conflict,
56
recognition that intervention was multifaceted.
The 1991 intervention into northern Iraq, Operation
Provide Comfort, is recognized as the first humanitarian
intervention of the post-Cold War era. 57 In its Resolution 688,

issued on March 20, 1991, the Security Council articulated for
the first time that an internal armed conflict-the repression of
Iraqi civilians (primarily Kurds) by Iraq-constituted a threat
to international peace and security.58 Under this purview, but
without explicit UNSC authorization, a U.S.-led operation was
52.
See MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR: A
DATA GUIDE TO INTER-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, INTRA-STATE, AND NON-STATE WARS, 1816-

2007, at 562 (2010) (reporting the rise of intrastate wars since the mid-1960s); USE OF
FORCE COMM., INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN

http://www.ila-hq.org/
available
at
28-32
(2010),
LAW
INTERNATIONAL
download.cfm/docidJ2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87 (defining noninternational
armed conflict); Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,39 J.
PEACE RES. 615, 616-23 (2002) (confirming that internal conflict is the dominant form of
conflict since the 1950s).
53.
JACOB BERCOVITCH & RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 103-04 (2009).

54.
Jim Whitman, A CautionaryNote on HumanitarianIntervention, 34 GEOJOURNAL
167, 172 (1994).
MICHAEL PUGH, PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, ISSUES IN
55.
WORLD POLITICS 134-56 (Brian White et al. eds., 1997); see also OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM &
TOM WOODHOUSE, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT: A

RECONCEPTUALIZATION 113 (1996) (addressing the suggestion by some scholars that "nonforcible humanitarian intervention" should cover a range of activities).
56.
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 15, U.N. Doc. A/47/277S/24111 (June 17, 1992).
57.

SEYBOLT, supra note 47, at 49.

S.C. Res. 688, supra note 51, 1 ("Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian
58.
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the
consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region ... ").
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launched in April 1991 to address the refugee situation along
the Iraq-Turkey border to avoid further humanitarian crises
after reports emerged that as many as 400 of the 400,000
59
refugees stranded in the mountains were dying every day.
Operation Provide Comfort is credited with saving over 7,000
Kurdish refugees in a crisis where over 46,000 people died.
During the early 1990s, several other humanitarian crises
gained international attention and the question of intervening for
humanitarian purposes was once again in the spotlight. The civil
war and subsequent lapse of the state in Somalia and the drought
of 1990 led to famine and a humanitarian crisis where an
60
estimated 192,000 people died in less than two years.
Responding to the recommendations of U.N. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UNSC adopted Resolution 751 by
which it decided that the continuation of "the magnitude of the
suffering caused by the conflict ...constitute[d] a threat to
international peace and security" and established the U.N.
61
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to provide humanitarian aid.
62
Humanitarian assistance continued over the next two years.
Then, in December 1992, the UNSC established UNOSOM II and
authorized the mission to employ Chapter VII measures, including
the use of force, in order to ensure "the delivery of humanitarian
assistance." 63 This operation, famously depicted in the film Black
64
Hawk Down, was criticized for being ineffective and costing lives.
During the same time period, the humanitarian crises caused by

59.
SEYBOLT, supra note 47, at 47-49 (discussing how the Iraqi military targeted
Kurdish communities to punish them for rebelling-alongside the Shia Arabs in the southagainst the Sunni government of Saddam Hussein).
60.
Id. at 52-53 (noting that the war killed an estimated 15,000-40,000 people and
the famine killed an additional estimated 131,000-152,000 people between January 1991
and August 1992).
61.
S.C. Res. 751, at 57-58 & 2, U.N. Doc. SJRES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992); SEYBOLT,
supra note 47, at 52-61 (discussing how UNOSOM I was active from September 1992 until
March 1993 and sought to achieve a ceasefire agreement to allow for the delivery of food aid
under the mandate "to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations in Somalia" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 767, 9 2, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/767 (July 27, 1992) (establishing
that the aim of Operation Provide Relief was to assist in emergency delivery of aid by U.N.
agencies and NGOs); S.C. Res. 775, 7, U.N. Doc SJRES/775 (Aug. 28, 1992).
63.
S.C. Res. 794, supra note 51, 7; see also S.C. Res. 814, 4, U.N. Doc. SfRES/814
(Mar. 26, 1993) (authorizing "assist[ance] in the provision of relief and in the economic
rehabilitation
of
Somalia ...the
repatriation
of
refugees
and
displaced
persons... promot[ion] and advance[ment of] political reconciliation," among other aims).
64.
Rep. of the Comm'n of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led to
Casualties Among Them, TT 137-162, U.N. Doc. S/19941653 (June 1, 1994). The film was
based on the book written by Mark Bowden. MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY
OF MODERN WAR (1999).
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the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was met by a U.N.
Peacekeeping Operation and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) bombing operation known as Operation Deliberate Force,
which were later criticized for not doing enough to protect Bosnian
civilians. 65 Then, in the spring of 1994, an estimated 800,000
people were killed in Rwanda in fewer than 100 days due to
genocide. 66 These crises, and the varied international responses to
them, cemented an emerging consensus that the use of force might
be necessary at times to avert humanitarian crises.
for
history
provides
important
background
This
understanding the context of NATO's unauthorized use of force to
intervene into the Kosovo War. 67 Kosovars sought independence
from Yugoslavia while Yugoslavia sought to maintain its
sovereignty over the Kosovo region. 68 Non-Albanian minorities
living in the Kosovo territory did not have the same interests as
Kosovars. 69 On March 31, 1998, the UNSC adopted Resolution
1160, which imposed an arms embargo on the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) because of its violence targeting the
independence-seeking Kosovo Liberation Army. 70 Recognizing the
deteriorating situation as a "threat to peace," the UNSC then
adopted Resolution 1199 on September 23, 1998, which expressed
grave concern at the reports of excessive and indiscriminate force
by FRY against Kosovar civilians and called upon FRY to take
steps to address and "avert the impending humanitarian
71
catastrophe."
The next day, NATO issued an "activation warning"
signaling its readiness to engage in an air strike campaign. 72 This

5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992) (authorizing the U.N.
65.
S.C. Res. 743,
Protection Force or UNPROFOR "to create the conditions of peace and security required for the
negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis). For a comprehensive history of the
events there, see SEYBOLT, supranote 47, at 61-70.
66. GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 263-65 (1995); Max
Boot, Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr.
2000, at 143,
143; Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL,
(last visited Feb. 5,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm
2014).
67.
For a detailed history of the Kosovo War, including the implications from the
previous war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see SEYBOLT, supra note 47, at 78-86.
68. Id. at 61-63.
69. Id. at 78-79.
70.
S.C. Res. 1160, supranote 49, 8.
71.
S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 49. Over 300,000 internally displaced persons faced
humanitarian disaster with the onset of winter and lack of adequate shelter. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS IN KOSOVO 61 (1998).
72.
Press Release, NATO, Statement by the Secretary General Following the
(Sept.
24,
1998),
available
at
ACTWARN
Decision
http://www.nato.int/docupri1998/p980924e.htm.
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prompted a series of diplomatic measures, including peace talks
led by Richard Holbrooke, which ultimately failed to achieve a
ceasefire.7 3 In the face of continued atrocities against civilian
Kosovars, NATO launched a bombing campaign against FRY that
74
started on March 24, 1999, and continued for eleven weeks.
NATO's stated purpose was to remove FRY forces, institute
peacekeepers, and provide for the safe return of refugees. Its use of
force to achieve these goals was significant. NATO engaged in over
38,000 air strikes over the course of 78 days. President Slobodan
Milogevid ultimately accepted a ceasefire to be followed by a
NATO-led peacekeeping force, and NATO ended its operations on
75
June 10, 1999.
Ultimately, the UNSC recognized the need for Kosovo to
enjoy substantial autonomy within FRY and supported the
development of a provisional constitution, established a UN
mission in Kosovo, and took other steps to assist Kosovo's
transition into a democratic, independent state.7 6 U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed special envoy Martti
Ahtisaari (former President of Finland) to conduct negotiations
with Kosovo and Serbia with the aim of achieving peaceful and
stable independence for Kosovo. 77 The Kosovo Status
Settlement was adopted by the UNSC and received financial
support from the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, paving the way for the declaration of Kosovo's
independence on February 17, 2008.78 At Serbia's request, the
ICJ issued an advisory opinion as to the legality of Kosovo's
79
independence, finding it to be valid under international law.
After the end of hostilities, Russia requested that the
Security Council consider the "extremely dangerous situation
caused by the unilateral military action of NATO against the

73. A Kosovo Chronology, FRONTLINE PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/showskosovo/etc/cron.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). The UN Security Council
later threatened to use force against FRY absent its compliance. S.C. Res. 1203,
1-4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
74.
A Kosovo Chronology, supra note 73.
75.
Id.
76.
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 14.
77.
Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Appoints Former President
Martti Ahtisaari of Finland as Special Envoy for Future Status Process for Kosovo (Nov.
15, 2005), availableat http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga955.doc.htm.
78.
See Fatos Bytyci, Kosovo Says Now Recognized by 100 Countries, REUTERS,
(June 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/us-kosovo-egypt-recognitionidUSBRE95P19M20130626?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews (stating that Kosovo's
independence is now recognized by 100 nations).
79.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 84 (July 22).
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."8 0 Russia argued that the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention is "in no way based on the
Charter or other generally recognized rules of international
law."''s Belarus, Yugoslavia, China, and India all agreed that
NATO's intervention was a violation of international law because
it was interfering in the internal affairs of another state and that
82
only the UNSC can authorize this based on Article 39 purposes.
Russia, India, and Belarus introduced a resolution (which was
defeated 12 to 3) that the use of force by NATO constituted "a
83
threat to international peace and security."
Proponents of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, such as
the United Kingdom, argued that NATO's actions were legal and
were "justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. 8 4 The Netherlands
agreed that the UNSC should make such decisions, but noted its
inability to do so:
[D]ue to one or two permanent members' rigid
interpretation of the concept of domestic jurisdiction, such a
resolution is not attainable, [but] we cannot sit back and
simply let the humanitarian catastrophe occur. In such a
situation we will act on the legal basis we have available,
and what we have available in this case is more than
85
adequate.
Canada recognized that "[h]umanitarian considerations underpin
our action. '8 6 Other countries commented on the inability of the
UNSC to take decisive and immediate action and the need to act
87
anyway.
Thus, even though NATO's actions were illegal at the time,
afterward, they were viewed as legitimate, being justified on

80.

Letter from the Russian Federation to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.

S/1999/653 (Mar. 24, 1999).
81.
U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 3988th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999).
82.
Id. at 12-16.

83. S.C. Draft Res., U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 16, 1999).
84. S/PV.3988, supra note 81, at 12; see also Planning Staff of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Foreign Pol'y Doc. No. 148, 1.3, reprinted in United Kingdom
Materials on InternationalLaw 1986, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 614, 619 (Geoffrey Marston
ed., 1987) ("[l]t cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal [however] .... the
overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of
a right of humanitarian intervention.").
85. S/PV.3988, supra note 81, at 8.
86. Id. at 6.
87. See id. at 7 (Gambia) ("[A]t times the exigencies of a situation demand, and
warrant, decisive and immediate action. We find that the present situation in Kosovo
deserves such treatment."); id. at 10 (Malaysia) (finding it necessary to act outside of the
UNSC).
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moral grounds in light of the atrocities that had taken place.88
Outside of the Council's debate, others stated their support for
humanitarian intervention. The Independent International
Commission on Kosovo concluded that "the NATO [military
intervention] was illegal, yet legitimate."8 9 U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright argued that NATO "has the legitimacy
to act to stop a catastrophe."90 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan acknowledged that there are times when force is
legitimate in pursuit of peace,.albeit with UNSC involvement. 9 1
Since Kosovo, the UNSC has authorized additional
interventions based, at least in part, on humanitarian concerns.
In its authorization of the use of force in East Timor in 1999, the
Council indicated that the aim was both to restore peace and
security and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. 92 The UNSC's
authorization of NATO's intervention into Libya "to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack"
through "all necessary measures" is a recent example of
intervention involving the use of authorized force based on

88. See INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON KOSOvO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 163 (2000) (construing the Security
Council's adoption of Resolution 1244 after NATO's intervention as adding a "sense of expost UN legitimacy to the operation"); Noam Chomsky, The Skeleton in the Closet: The
Responsibility to Protect in History, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, supra note 24, at 11, 11-15; Aidan Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect in
InternationalLaw, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra
note 24, at 84, 84-85 (noting that the aftermath of Kosovo and other humanitarian crises
indicate a responsibility to protect people); Henkin, supra note 49, at 824-25 (arguing
that unilateral intervention should remain illegal); Tara McCormack, The Responsibility
to Protect and the End of the Western Century, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 24, at 35, 35-37; Anthea Roberts, Legality vs
Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal but Justified?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION
AND THE USE OF FORCE 179, 182-83 (Philip Alston & E. MacDonald eds., 2008).
89.
See INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, supra note 88, at 186 (explaining that
NATO's response in Kosovo illustrated the balance between interfering within a state's
domestic jurisdiction and the need to respond to humanitarian challenges).
90.
Madeleine Albright, Sec'y of State, Dep't of State, Press Conference on Kosovo,
Brussels, Belgium (Oct. 8, 1998), available at http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/
1998/981008.html.
91.
See Press Release, Global Policy Forum, Statement by Kofi Annan on Kosovo
Crisis, The Effectiveness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining International
Peace and Security (May 18, 1999), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component
content/article/190/38833.html.
92.
S.C. Res. 1264,
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999) ("Authorizes the
establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to
the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General on 12
September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and security in East Timor, to
protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to
facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in
the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate .... ").
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humanitarian purposes. 93 This history of the evolution of
peacekeeping and humantarian intervention helps explain why
decisions about intervention are controversial and how they are
informed by competing norms.
III. CHALLENGES DECISION-MAKERS FACE

Decision-making at the UNSC is rife with challenges. 94 One of
the central constraints is that formal resolutions are adopted by
consensus. Yet it is difficult for the Council to reach consensus
about whether or not to authorize intervention measures if they do
not agree on the reason for intervention. This, in turn, rests on
understandings about why intervention should be authorized.
International law's substantive rules simply provide that the
Council has the authority to make such decisions but does not
address what the underlying purpose for intervention should be.
This Part examines these and related decision-making challenges.
A. Findinga Reason for Intervening
The Security Council is the one organization under
international law that may authorize the use of force in
interventions into sovereign nations. 95 As a decision-making entity,
it faces many challenges-political, procedural, and otherwise. One
reason the Council has difficulty reaching consensus about political
choices regarding intervention is because it lacks consensus about
the reason for intervening.
A U.N. Security Council diplomat explains the problem.
International legal rules do play "somewhat of a role.., but [they
are] not a predominant force" in shaping political decisions about
intervention. 96 'We have something we want to do, the lawyers
93.
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, 4 ("Authorizes Member States that have notified the
Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures,
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack

...
.");

see President Barack Obama, Remarks at Joint

Press Conference (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/201103/28remarks-president-address-nation-libya ("Qaddafi had lost the confidence of
his people and the legitimacy to lead, and I said that he needed to step down from power.");
Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, No-Flight Zone in Libya Backed by Arab League, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at Al. The endorsement by the Arab League of a no-fly zone was
significant because they were willing to allow a foreign military presence capable of
enforcement. Id.
94. See, e.g., MATHESON, supranote 16.
95. Nations can also make such decisions pursuant to self-defense under U.N. Charter
art. 51.
96. Telephone Interview with U.N. Security Council diplomat (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
Interview] (on file with Author). The source wishes to remain anonymous. The purpose of this
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craft language. [They] don't ever say you cannot do the objective
you want to do" because it goes against international law. "The
aim [of intervention]-what we are trying to do-increasingly
shapes UNSC decision-making about intervention." The diplomat
then described the Council's recent decision to authorize
MONUSCO to use force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel, and human
rights defenders as an example. 97 The diplomat explained that
the Council is not just motivated by each member's national
interests anymore .... Few members have national
interests in this region. The support for this U.N. Mandate
was based on other reasons, reasons having to do with
concern for human lives. The problem is that international
law is invoked to support different and competing decisions.
Syria has become synonymous with R2P. People use R2P as
98
a way to create a hierarchy of international legal norms.
This interview suggests that, in this case, the Council's
motivation for authorizing intervention was to protect human
life. It also suggests that the Council seeks clarity about the
general purpose for intervention.
Upon first glance, Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides
such guidance. It says that the UNSC "shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to

interview was to gather insights about how the UNSC makes decisions about intervention.

This interview is not a part of a broader survey and does not intend to provide empirical
support.
97. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo or 'MONUSCO' has a description of its mandate available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/mandate.shtml ("MONUSCO took
over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation-the United Nations Organization
Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)--on 1 July 2010. The original
mandate of the mission was established by Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to
reflect the new phase reached in the country. It was authorized to use all necessary
means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians,
humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical
violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace
consolidation efforts."); see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE
CONGO:
OPINION
SURVEY
AND
IN-DEPTH
RESEARCH
38
(2009),

http://www.icrc.orgleng/assets/files/other/drc.pdf (observing that, since 1996, millions have
died as a result of the hostilities in the country); Jeffrey Gettleman, The World's Worst
War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at SRI (naming the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo "one of the bloodiest conflicts since World War II, with more than five million
dead").

98. Interview, supra note 96; see also EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL:
PRACTICE AND PROMISE 85 (2006) (highlighting the importance of the "humanitarian
imperative" associated with acts of intervention today).
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maintain or restore international peace and security." 99
Historically, the Council has stuck to these grounds. In the
conflict in Cyprus, the Council determined that the situation in
Cyprus "is likely to threaten international peace and security" if
allowed to continue, and authorized the establishment of a
peacekeeping force. 100 In its resolution regarding the Iran-Iraq
war, the UNSC recalled provisions of Article 2 and determined
that the reestablishment of "peace and security in the region
require[d] strict adherence to these provisions." 10 1
However, the U.N. Charter does not define what actions
constitute such threats, breaches, or acts of aggression. The
negotiating history of the U.N. Charter reveals why. During the
San Francisco rounds, the Third Committee decided "to leave to
the Council the entire decision ... as to what constitutes a threat
10 2
to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression."
This provided the Council with the flexibility and discretion to
03
act as it deemed necessary in any given context.
This understanding of Article 39 gives the Council the
discretion to authorize intervention for new reasons, such as
humanitarian concerns, by interpreting new crises as
constituting threats to or breaches of the peace. The Council's
recent decisions authorizing intervention suggest that it is doing
just that. In 1991, the Council's Resolution 688 articulated that
the internal armed conflict-the repression of Iraqi-Kurdish
99.
U.N. Charter art. 39 (establishing the U.N.'s authority with respect to threats to
the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POSTWAR
FOREIGN POLICY PREPARATION, 1938-1945 (1950), reprinted in RUTH B. RUSSELL &
JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1940-1945 app. F, at 993 (1958) (noting that as the negotiating history of
the U.N. Charter reveals in the 1943 Outline Plan, it was intended that the Council be
given authority to "(c) determine the existence of a threat or act of aggression, and (d) to
institute measures to repress such threat or act"); see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The
Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 516 (1995) (stating that the
UNSC is "the best (in fact, the only) judge of what amounts to a threat to international
peace for the purposes of chapter VII").
100.
S.C. Res. 186, U.N. Doc. SfRES/186 (Mar. 4, 1964); Christopher Greenwood, The
United Nations as a Guarantorof InternationalPeace and Security: Past, Present and
Future- A United Kingdom View, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE AGE OF FIFTY: A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 59, 63-64 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995).
101.
S.C. Res. 514, at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/514 (July 12, 1982).
102.
Verbatim Minutes of the First Meeting of Commission III at 6, U.N. Doc. 943
111/5 (June 12, 1945), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 12, 17 (photo. reprint 1998) (1945); RUSSELL &
MUTHER, supra note 99, at 669-72.
103.
See RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 99, at 670 ("Because it was not always
possible to distinguish clearly between a threat and a breach, the important thing was to
leave the evaluation of circumstances to the Council, giving it the flexibility to use the
most appropriate of the measures available. With only minor verbal changes, the
Coordination Committee made this provision Article 39 of the Charter.").
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civilians by the government-constituted
a threat to
international peace and security. 10 4 In 2011, the UNSC
authorized Member States "to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack" in Libya through "all
necessary measures." 10 5 More recently, the Council authorized
intervention into the DRC via the creation of the "Intervention
Brigade," 10 6 mandated to "carry out targeted offensive
operations" "with the responsibility of neutralizing armed
groups.' 10 7 As in Libya, the UNSC based the Brigade's purpose
on humanitarian grounds, calling upon it to "prevent the
expansion of all armed groups ...and to disarm them in order
to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by
armed groups on state authority and civilian security in
eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities."'' 0 8
These decisions suggest a broadening of the Council's basis for
authorizing use of force that extends beyond traditional
Article 39 grounds into concerns arising from humanitarian
crises in noninternational armed conflicts. 0 9 But not all
Council members agree. Without a shared understanding for
the reason for intervention, consensus-based decision-making
is severely hindered.110

104.
S.C. Res. 688, supra note 51,
1 ("Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the
consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region ....
").
105.
See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14, 4 (authorizing Member States to "take all
necessary measures"); see also Paul R. Williams & Colleen (Betsy) Popken, Libya and the
Evolution of the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 225, 226
(2012) ("Resolution 1973 and its subsequent implementation provide a blueprint for
effective humanitarian intervention.").
106.
S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 51,
9, 12 ("Authorizes MONUSCO, through its
military component, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 11 above, to take
all necessary measures to perform the following tasks, through its regular forces and its
Intervention Brigade as appropriate ....").
107.
Id.; Press Release, Security Council, "Intervention Brigade" Authorized as
Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic
Republic of Congo, U.N. Press Release SC/10964 (Mar. 28, 2013).
108.
S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 51,
12(b).
109.
See Kenneth Anderson, United Nations Collective Security and the United States
Security Guaranteein an Age of Rising Multipolarity:The Security Council as the Talking
Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 55, 87-88 (2009) (describing the United States'
role in UNSC-authorized interventions as driven by "collective security altruism").
110.
See Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7
(Dec. 21, 1982) (describing the decision-making proceses of the Security Council);
MATHESON, supra note 16; Madeleine 0. Hosli et al., Squaring the Circle? Collective and
Distributive Effects of United Nations Security Council Reform, 6 REV. INT'L
ORGANIZATIONS 163, 165-67, 174 (2011) (explaining that Council decisions require
support of all five permanent Members as well as nine of fifteen total votes, and observing
that "common notions of fairness or shared values are hard to come by").
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B. PrioritizingAmong Norms
1.

Sovereignty or HumanitarianProtection?

In the absence of agreement about the basis for authorizing
the use of force to intervene into armed conflicts, the Council's
decision-making process disintegrates into a debate about
competing priorities."1 A decision to intervene for humanitarian
purposes prioritizes certain norms (e.g., humanitarian protection
and human rights) above the sovereignty-based norm of
nonintervention. 112 The central decision that the Council faces is
determining when the norm of nonintervention should give way
to other norms.' 1 3 Although this decision is a political choice, it is
one that is informed by international law. What the Council
seeks, and what international law fails to provide, is a
mechanism for prioritizing among these competing norms." 4
The Council faced this dilemma in its treatment of the crisis
in Syria. The armed conflict there was categorized as a civil war,
which originally was not thought to invoke Article 39 conditions,
until reports of human rights abuses and mass human suffering
began to emerge. In 2013, the Syrian government was accused of
using chemical weapons, specifically the gas sarin, against
civilians. In response, the Council was called upon by the United
States and others to authorize the use of force. U.S. President
Barack Obama, arguing before the U.N. General Assembly, said:
I want to outline where the United States of America
stands on these issues. With respect to Syria, we believe
that as a starting point, the international community
must enforce the ban on chemical weapons.... The ban
111.
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 25, at 216-19 (describing the changing functions
of the Security Council-e.g., its response to changes in collective security-to address
these norm conflicts).
112.
While not all cases of intervention raise this challenge, some do. See Gulati &
Khosa, supra note 9, at 400-02 (arguing that proponents claim intervention is consistent
with the purpose of the U.N. Charter, but that opponents claim intervention is
inconsistent with the principle of sovereignty); Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality and the
Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323, 327-29
(2002) ("[Tlhe main problem of humanitarian intervention consists in the divergence of
law and morality: while considerations of justice and human rights demand the
recognition of a right to intervention, international law prevents this by anachronistically
relying on order and on state sovereignty."); see also FINNEMORE, supra note 37, at 73-84
(explaining how normative prioritization changes and affects the interplay between
conflicting norms).
113.
See Krisch, supra note 112, at 327 (arguing that "the main problem of
humanitarian intervention consists in the divergence of law and morality," "law" as
represented by "order and.., state sovereignty" and "morality" as represented by
"considerations of justice and human rights").
114.
Interview, supra note 96.
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against the use of chemical weapons, even in war, has
been agreed to by 98 percent of humanity.
...
[W]ithout a credible military threat, the Security
Council had demonstrated no inclination to act at all....

...If we cannot agree even on this, then it will show
that the United Nations is incapable of enforcing the
most basic of international laws.
...[S]overeignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit
wanton murder, or an excuse for the international
115
community to turn a blind eye.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's response to intervention
into Syria was to invoke its sovereignty and argue that it is
"fighting a regional and global battle and must have more time to

resolve

[it]."116

Permanent Security Council member Russia

echoed Syria's protest, "deem[ing] unacceptable any external
interference in Syrian affairs." 117 Of course, leaders of nations
facing intervention routinely invoke international law to argue
that intervention is not permissible.1 1 8 For example, during the
"Arab Spring" in Egypt, then-President Muhammad Hosni El
Sayed Mubarak invoked the principle of sovereignty, arguing
that "[i]ntervention in our internal affairs is strange,
unacceptable and we will not allow it."119
115.
President Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/
US_en_0.pdf.
116.
See Mona Mahmood & Luke Harding, Bashar al-Assad Says There Is No End in
Sight to Syrian Civil War, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2012) (alteration in original),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/29/bashar-al-assad-syria-war?newsfeed=true
(showing the U.N.'s continuing involvement in Syria by protecting refugees); see also
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 21 (1999) ("Weaker states

have always been the strongest supporters of the rule of nonintervention."); Kit Daniels,
Assad: Syria is a Sovereign Country Fighting al-Qaeda, INFOWARS.COM (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://www.infowars.com/assad-syria-is-a-sovereign-country-fighting-alqaeda/
(reporting
that Assad claims that Syria is not a puppet government and that they are fighting rebels
who are connected with al-Qaeda).
117.
U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6520th mtg. at 26-27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6520 (Apr. 21,
2011).
118.
See KRASNER, supra note 116, at 21 ("Weaker states have always been the
strongest supporters of the rule of nonintervention."); Saddam Addresses Iraqi People,
CNN (Mar. 20, 2003), http:lwww.cnn.com/2003IWORLD/meast/03/20/irq.war.saddam.
transcript/.
119.
Mubarak Should Leave in "Honorable" Way: Egypt's PM, AL ARABIYA NEWS
(Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/O2/03/136159.html
(providing a
statement made in Cairo, Egypt, by Omar Suleiman, former Army General).
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Who is right? A decision to intervene is necessarily a
trump
Should
sovereignty
about
priorities.
decision
humanitarian imperatives or should the concern for grave loss of
human life trump sovereignty? 120 The Council has struggled with
this choice. Compare the Council's press release "call[ing] upon
the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded
access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of
assistance, in accordance with international law,"'121 to its agenda
reaffirming its "strong commitment to the sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity of Syria."' 22 To date, the
Council has not authorized the "Libyan" intervention option in
Syria. 123 The Council has taken other measures, including its
unanimous decision on September 27, 2013, to eliminate Syria's
1 24
stockpile of chemical weapons.
The Council's decisions about intervention turn on the
international legal concept of sovereignty. As Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht once observed, "any inquiry of a general character in
the field of international law finds itself at the very start
confronted with the doctrine of sovereignty."1 25 Historically, the
concept has been defined in various ways. 126 In its 1927 Lotus
120. LUCK, supra note 98, at 85 (discussing the "humanitarian imperative"
associated with acts of intervention today).
121. Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Syria, U.N. Press Release
SC/10564 (Mar. 1, 2012) ("The members of the Security Council call upon the Syrian
authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to
all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding
principles of humanitarian assistance.").
122. U.N. SCOR 66th Sess., 6598th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S[PV.6598 (Aug. 3, 2011).
Interview, supra note 96. One challenge resulting from recent actions
123.
authorized by the Security Council, particularly in Libya, is that they will constrain
similar action by the Council in the future. See Michael Ignatieff, The Duty to Rescue,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 24, 2008, at 41 (examining political factors and attitudes that may
hamper Security Council authorization of humanitarian actions); see also Anthony Faiola,
In Loss for Cameron, Parliament Rejects Push for Military Action, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2013, at A6 (discussing Britain's refusal to join U.S. forces in military action in Syria and
noting that the result may have been "the biggest rupture in the U.S.-British 'special
relationship"' in over thirty years).
124. See S.C. Res. 2118, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013) (endorsing the
decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons calling for and planning the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons).
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL
125.
COMMUNITY ch. 2, § 1, at 3 (2000 ed.).
126.
JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 48-49 (M.J. Tooley trans.,
1955) (1576) (asserting that sovereignty should never be "granted out" to a foreigner
because it would provide a "stepping-stone" where the grantee could become the
sovereign); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?.: THE POLITICS
OF ASHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 16-18 (1992) (describing legal sovereignty of a
state as resting in its authority and its power to enforce that authority); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 121 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1957) (1651) (describing sovereign power as
indivisible).
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decision, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that
"[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore
be presumed." 127 They did not want to be bound by a higher
authority. This was also the view taken by most nations in the
negotiations that led to the development of the United Nations. 128
The Charter provides that the U.N. is "based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its members," but it does not define
the term "sovereignty." Through other treaties, customs, and
state practices, the term "sovereign equality" has come to mean
(1) [t]hat states are juridically equal; (2) [t]hat they enjoy
the rights inherent in their full sovereignty; (3) [t]hat the
personality of the state is respected, as well as its
territorial integrity and political independence; [and]
(4) [t]hat the state should, under international order,
comply faithfully with its international duties and

obligations. 129
Scholars have sought to further clarify the meaning of
sovereignty. Krasner identifies four types: domestic sovereignty
(public authority within a state and its ability to assert effective
control); interdependence
sovereignty (ability to control
transborder activity); international legal sovereignty (mutual
recognition of states); and Westphalian sovereignty (exclusion of
external actors from internal affairs). 130 Hinsley describes
sovereignty as an assumption about power and authority that
attempts to define the rules of how they relate to each other in
order to establish the interstate system.1 31 Jackson argues that
the "grundnorm of such a political arrangement is the basic
prohibition against foreign intervention which simultaneously
imposes a duty of forbearance and confers a right of
independence on all statesmen."13 2
By contrast, the emerging view. of sovereignty today
theorizes that it is a limited right that exists in relation to other

127.

S.S. 'Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept.

128.

See RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 99, at 198-99.

129.

Report of Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/1A to Committee I/1 at 1-2, U.N. Doc.

7).

739 IIl/A/19(a) (June 1, 1945), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 717, 717-18 (photo. reprint 1998) (1945).
130.

KRASNER, supra note 116, at 9.

131.

See F.H. Hinsley, The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States,

in IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 275, 275 (W.J. Stankiewicz ed., 1969) ("Authority and
power are facts .... [S]overeignty is not a fact....
It is an assumption about authority.").
132.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
AND THE THIRD WORLD 6 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
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rights, responsibilities, and interests. 133 The archetype example
is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which redefines
134
sovereignty as a responsibility owed by states to their citizens.
R2P holds that "the primary responsibility for the protection of
its people lies with the state itself," but when a state is
"unwilling or unable" to provide such protection "the principle of
nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect."135 When a state fails to fulfill its responsibility to protect
its population from international crimes, then its right to be free
136
from external intervention is rendered conditional.
The foundations of this view predate R2P. In 1995 for
example, in Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated that
[have] been
State-sovereignty-oriented approach[es]
gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented
approach.... Why protect civilians from belligerent
violence or ban rape .... when two sovereign States are
engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same
bans or providing the same protection when armed
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 10, at 12
133.
para. 2.7.

134.
Id. at XI ("State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.").
135.

primary

GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY

CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 39-43 (2008) (providing additional framework for the concept
including both the state responsibility to protect and a corresponding right of other states
and the international community to intervene). Types of intervention include prevention
through early warning, assessing root causes and direct prevention, reaction through
military and peaceful means and rebuilding, occupation and imperialism, and postintervention obligations among others. See id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General,
11-12, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009)
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
(outlining the three pillars that the World Summit Outcome document suggests); S.C.
4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (reaffirming the World Summit
Res. 1674,
138-140,
Outcome document regarding the responsibility to protect); G.A. Res. 60/1,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) (establishing widespread state support for the
principle of R2P); INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 10,
at XI, 15-16 paras. 2.24-2.27, (establishing R2P as an emerging norm in international
law). See generally Monica Serrano, The Responsibility to Protect:Libya and C6te D'Ivoire,
AMSTERDAM L.F., Summer 2011, at 92 (documenting UNSC responses to mass atrocities
and arguing that there is a notable shift representing a consensus about R2P).
136.

See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 10, at XI

("Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert
it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.");
see also Arnison, supra note 36, at 199 ("State sovereignty-a cornerstone of the
international legal system-poses a formidable obstacle to humanitarian intervention.");
James B. Steinberg, InternationalInvolvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, supra note 12, at 27, 52-

54 (describing the justification for intervening to prevent human rights violations with
respect to the Bosnian conflict).
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violence has erupted 'only' within the territory of a
137
sovereign State?
Speaking in 1999 in response to the Genocide in Rwanda,
then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that
"[s]tate sovereignty was being redefined by the forces of
globalization and international cooperation" and that "[t]he State
was now widely understood to be the servant of the people and
not vice versa." 138 This view is embraced by those seeking a
democratization of sovereignty as well as those that believe that
sovereign rights are based in people and not in territory. 139
The debate at the Council about intervention is
representative of the larger debate about the meaning of
sovereignty in today's world and whether it is, in fact, an obsolete
concept. Many agree that globalization is "bringing an evolution
of the international system past the sovereign Westphalia
state."'140 Javier Solana, the former Secretary-General of NATO
argued that "humanity and democracy [are] two principles
essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order."' 4' Thus,
emerging circumstances, such as the integration of Europe, are
making sovereignty obsolete because "[tlhe core of the concept of
Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European
balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of
individual states that had emerged following the Peace of

137.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/case/tadic/4.
138.
See Press Release, General Assembly, Implications of International Response to
Events in Rwanda, Kosovo Examined by Secretary-General, U.N. Press Release GA/9595
(Sept. 20, 1999).
139.
See, e.g., LUCK, supra note 98, at 85 (highlighting the importance of the
"humanitarian imperative" associated with acts of intervention today); Samantha Besson,
The Authority of InternationalLaw: Lifting the State Veil, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 343, 343
(2009) (arguing that the key to the authority of international law requires "focusing on
the individual as the ultimate subject of authority in international law"); Jean L. Cohen,
Whose Sovereignty? Empire vs. International Law, ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Winter
2004/2005, at 1, 3-4 (contending that the democratization of international relations
requires, among other things, "the creation of a global rule of law that protects both the
sovereign equality of states.., and human rights"); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and
Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 867-69, 872,
874-76 (1990) (discussing the convergence of sovereignty-limiting theories as a de facto
matter within the legal scholarship but also arguing that such views may not be wise or
close to settled law).
140.
TATAH MENTAN, THE STATE IN AFRICA 139 (2010); see also A. Claire Cutler,
Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and
Organization:A Crisis ofLegitimacy, 27 REV. INT'L STUD. 133, 149 (2001).
141.
Javier Solana, Former Secretary-General, NATO, Speech at the Symposium on
the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia: Securing Peace in Europe (Nov.
12, 1998), availableat http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s9811l2a.htm.
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Westphalia in 1648."142 For these reasons and more, U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared that
[s]tate sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being
redefined... States are now widely understood to be
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice
versa.... When we read the Charter today, we are more
than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual
1 43
human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.
These debates about the meaning of sovereignty and the
importance of humanitarian protection present challenges for the
Security Council as its members strive to reach agreement about
if and how to address today's threats to the peace.
2. Norms and Norm Conflicts in International Law. The
debate about whether to choose sovereignty or humanitarian
protection in the context of intervention can be understood as a
norm conflict in international law. Norms express "the meaning
that something ought to be, or ought to be done."1 44 The purpose
of norms is to regulate behavior. 145 For a norm to have legal
effect there must be a general belief in its ability to influence
behavior. 146 Within international law jus cogens are peremptory
norms that express a fundamental principle of international law
from which there is no derogation.1 47 To be a jus cogens norm, the
norm must be recognized by the "international community of
142.
Joschka Fischer, Speech at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany: From
Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration (May 12,
2000), available at http://www.cvce.euobj/speech byjoschkafischer on the ultimate_
objective-of europeanintegrationberlin 12may_2000-en-4cd2fa7-d9d-4cd2-91c92746a3297773.html.
143.
Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49; see
also Reisman, supra note 139, at 869 (arguing that the modern notion of sovereignty is
"the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty").
144.
See Hans Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 107 (1959) ("[A]
[T]he norm is created or
legal norm is a prescription or permission or authorization ....
posited by an act of will; then it is a positive norm. The law as a system of norms created
by acts of human will is positive law.").
JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How
145.
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158-59 (2003) (describing

norms as commanding, prescribing, permitting, or exempting certain behaviors).
W. Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International
146.
Politics, in 1 ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS 135, 135-36 (Emmanuel

G. Bello & Bola A. Ajibola eds., 1992).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
147.
331, 344 ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.").
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states as a whole," which is a high standard to meet. The general
prohibition on the use of force is an accepted jus cogens norm
given its existence in the U.N. Charter as expressed in
Article 2(4).148 Arguments have been made that prohibitions
against genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, and violations of
149
self-determination are also jus cogens.
Norm conflicts are inherent to every legal system. A conflict
between norms arises when "[o]ne of the two norms constitutes,
in and of itself, breach of the other norm."150 This can occur when
the fulfillment of rights or obligations under one norm breaches
another norm.1 51 As a practical matter, when a nation cannot
uphold two norms-widely construed to include permissions,
prohibitions, and obligations-there is a conflict. 152 For example,
international trade treaties have created economic rights for
53
states that violate other existing environmental obligations.
148.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Treaty Between the United States and
Other Powers Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(Kellogg-Briand Pact), art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 59
("The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare ... that they condemn recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another.").
149.
See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law's Higher
Ethical Norms, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 78, 81-87 (Donald
Earl Childress III ed., 2012) (finding that there is no consensus concerning the scope of
the jus cogens definition and explaining how these norms have ethical foundations).
150.
PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 275.
151.
There is an abundance of literature describing other norm conflicts in
international law. See, e.g., id. at 184-88 (identifying categories of norm conflict); C.
Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401, 442-45
(1953) (discussing the lex prior principle and the factors used to determine which
conflicting treaty has priority); Marko Milanovi6, Norm Conflict in International Law:
Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69, 72-74, 76-79 (2009) (describing
norm conflicts in human rights law and presenting practical approaches for addressing
them); Erich Vranes, The Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in InternationalLaw and Legal
Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 395, 410-12 (2006) (describing why norm conflicts also exist
between competing obligations and rights).
152.
Vranes, supranote 151, at 411-12. Some scholars advocate a broad definition of
norm conflict. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 100-01 (Michael
Hartney trans., 1991) (1979) (discussing the possibility of certain behaviors that are
simultaneously forbidden and commanded by different norms); PAUWELYN, supra note
145, at 5-9 (defining such as a conflict arising between legally binding norms that invoke
the rights and obligations of states that cannot be resolved through harmonious
interpretation and distinguishing this from a conflict of laws); id. at 199 (describing a
conflict of norms as "a situation where one norm breaches, has led to or may lead to
breach of, another norm").
153.
See Sabrina Shaw & Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State
of Play, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 129, 132-37 (2002) (discussing issues arising between the
World Trade Organization and Multilateral Environmental Agreements); see also
PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 187 (providing an example of how a WTO rule may conflict
with

a

treaty

obligation);

BRAD

R.

ROTH,

SOVEREIGN

EQUALITY

AND

MORAL

DISAGREEMENT 218-20 (2011) (discussing the tensions that arise when competing
interests conflict-e.g., law's responsibility to protect order and uphold a nation's
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Norm conflicts in international law invoke questions about the
nature of the right or obligation, whether moral, legal, or both,
and about who is responsible (e.g., the international community,
a state, individuals, etc.).15 4 In addition, tensions caused by norm
conflicts occur over substance (e.g., the sources of legal rules and
the meaning of the norms underlying them) and authority (e.g.,
the institutions or entities who produce, interpret, and apply
law). 155 The recent proliferation of international law and
fragmentation among its sources has called attention to the
prevalence of norm conflicts and the potential threats they pose
156
to the legitimacy of the international legal system.
3. Addressing Norm Conflicts. What, then, are the options
for addressing norm conflicts? First, norm conflicts can be
resolved through hierarchy, which creates an ordering
mechanism for distinguishing the relationship that should be in
force when there is a conflict. In U.S. law, for example, the
Supremacy Clause serves as an absolute hierarchy that resolves
conflicts between laws based on their sources, with the
Constitution reigning as the highest source of law.1 57 In the event
of a conflict between federal and state laws, federal law displaces
state law. However, no such hierarchy exists in international law
because it does not prioritize among its norm-creating sources
(treaties, custom, general principles, and state practice).1 58 There

constitution versus protecting the right of self-determination of the majority as well as
minority rights).
154.
See James Crawford, MultilateralRights and Obligations in InternationalLaw,
in 319 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 328, 342-44 (2006) (discussing the distinction between norm and
obligation and the consequences that may arise when multilateral treaties pose a conflict
between competing norms and obligations); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interests in International Law, in 250 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 229-33 (1994) (describing
some duties as owed only by virtue of agreement between states and others owed to the
international community as a whole).
155.
Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative
Integration as Authority Allocation, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 99, 10104 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
156.
PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 12-13; see also U.N. Rep. of the Int'l Law
512, U.N. Doc. A/57/10
Comm'n, 54th Sess., Apr. 29-June 7, July 22-Aug. 16, 2002,
(commissioning a study on the diversification of international law, which was to include
review of the hierarchy of international obligations).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
157.
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ...").
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the
158.
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
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are plural priorities among the norms themselves, and the
sources of such norms do not provide for enhanced or diminished
status. 159
Absent addressing norm conflicts through a preexisting
hierarchy, the matter can be resolved through interpretation
based on the substantive meaning of the norms.1 60 When the
norm conflict is inherent-meaning that one norm conflicts with
another norm of jus cogens-the conflict can be resolved by
determining that one norm gives way to the other (because it is
illegal or it ceases to exist). 161 The more common approach is to
interpret the requisite obligations or rights in a way that
eliminates or obscures the conflict. 162 The ICJ, for example, has
followed a practice of harmonization, finding that "[i]t is a rule of
interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in
principle, be interpreted as producing and as intended to produce
effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of
it."163 In other words, the decision-maker interprets the requisite
obligations or rights in a way that eliminates or obscures the
164
conflict.
An alternative interpretive approach for addressing norm
conflicts is through the application of principle-based rules. For
example, the principle of lex specialis provides that "the more

obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail."); Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (enumerating the types of international law to be applied by the
ICJ while rendering decisions, but not ranking or according greater weight to any type
over any other); see also Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal
Sources of InternationalLaw, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 153, 160 (Martinus Nijhoff et al. eds.,
1958) (noting that judicial decisions and the opinions of learned scholars are generally not
viewed as sources of law that create norms but instead that they reflect already existing
norms); Dinah Shelton, International Law and 'Relative Normativity,' in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 145, 146 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
159.
See PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 94-95, 155-56 (describing general versus
particular international law, whether custom continues to exist separate from treaties
that codify its norms, whether particular laws can be exempt from general laws, and other
related problems of the hierarchy of laws and their sources).
160.
Id. at 22 ("The shift from all norms of international law being equal toward the
recognition that some norms, based on their substantive content, are more important
than others, has further contributed to the potential for conflict between norms.").
161.
See id. at 275-80, 298-99 (discussing the resolution of inherent normative
conflicts through determinations of invalidity or illegality).
162.
See id. at 272 (making a distinction between apparent conflicts and genuine
conflict and arguing that the latter cannot be resolved through interpretation).
163.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary Objections,
1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Nov. 26); see also PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 240-41 ("When
faced with two possible interpretations, one of which harmonises the meaning of the two
norms in question, the meaning that allows for harmonisation of the two norms-and
hence avoids conflict-ought to be preferred.").
164.
See PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 272.
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special norm prevails over the more general norm" because it is a
more precise or effective expression of the law. 165 In other
situations, the more general rule prevails on the basis that it is
primary and thus more essential. 166 For example, the ICJ found
that Libya's obligations under U.N. Charter Article 25 to
surrender the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing to the United
Kingdom and the United States prevailed over its rights provided
in the 1971 Montreal Convention to keep the suspects for trial in
Libya. 167 If two conflicting rules created simultaneously by the
same legal authority contradict each other, there is a logical
contradiction, and the latter rule should supersede the former. 168
Applying this test or the lex specialis test to the U.N. Charter,
both would determine that the right to use force in self-defense
provided by the latter rule in Article 51 should supersede the
general prohibition on the use of force established by Article 2(4).
These and other approaches aim to provide means for integrating
differing norms in order to preserve the integrity of the
69
international legal system.1
However, norm conflicts are not always resolvable through
legal approaches. In rare cases, it may be that the legal decisionmaker (e.g., judge or arbitrator) is unable to find a basis in
international law for discerning which of the two competing
norms should prevail. This is called a non liquet, or a situation
where no law applies. 170 The ICJ pronounced a non liquet in its
165.
See id. at 385, 387.
See id. at 386 (explaining that lex specialis as a conflict rule is subject to 'Jus
166.
cogens, Arts. 41/58 of the Vienna Convention and explicit conflict clauses").
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
167.
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
2, 6, 42 (Apr. 14); Questions of
U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 114,
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), Provisional Measures, 1992
2, 6, 39 (Apr. 14).
I.C.J. 3,
See KELSEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 21, at 206 (arguing that if two norms
168.
contradict each other, the latter supersedes the former, and therefore there is no conflict);
see also Vranes, supra note 151, at 413-14 (offering a Test of Joint Compliance, which
asks whether it is possible for an actor to comply with the second norm after complying
with the first, and offering a Breach of Norms Test: "[a] conflict between two norms occurs
if in obeying or applying one norm, the other one is necessarily or possibly violated'
(alteration in original) (quoting Hans Kelsen, Derogation,in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN
HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND, 339, 349 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1962))).
169.
Broude, supra note 155, at 99-100 (arguing that approaching international law
as a coherent legal system maintains the "meaningful interrelationships" between its
norms and avoids the concept of international law as "not just an inherently problemridden anarchical society but a chaotic one" (footnote omitted)).
170.
See PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 150-51 (describing non liquet and the debate
among legal scholars as to whether or not it can exist, correlating to whether or not
international law is a complete system); id at 419-21 (noting that this is an exceptional
circumstance and describing the WTO appellate case of US-Certain Products as a
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Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons because it
determined that
in view of the current state of international law, and of the
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be
171
at stake.
In his separate opinion, ICJ Judge Fleischhauer explained
there is no rule in international law according to which one
of the conflicting principles would prevail over the
other.... The principles and rules of the humanitarian law
and the other principles of law applicable in armed conflict,
such as the principle of neutrality on the one side and the
inherent right of self-defence on the other, which are
through the very existence of the nuclear weapon in sharp
opposition to each other, are all principles and rules of law.
None of these principles and rules is above the law, they are
of equal rank in law and they can be altered by law. They
are justiciable. Yet international law has so far not
developed-neither in conventional nor in customary lawa norm on how these principles can be reconciled in the face
of the nuclear weapon. As I stated above (paragraph 3 of
this separate opinion), there is no rule giving prevalence of
one over the other of these principles and rules.
International politics has not yet produced a system of
collective security of such perfection that it could take care
172
of the dilemma, swiftly and efficiently.
173
In the event of a non liquet, the choice becomes a political one.
For example, in U.S. constitutional law, when faced with the
substantive law question of how broadly or how narrowly to
define the scope of presidential power under Article II-which in
difficult cases requires a choice of whether to privilege the
Constitution's efforts to protect liberty or instead privilege
security through the horizontal separation of powers-justices

potential

example);

Daniel

Bodansky,

'Non

Liquet

and the Incompleteness of

International Law," in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 153, 153-70 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands
eds., 1999).
171.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
266 (July 8).
172.
Id. at 307-08 (separate opinion of Judge Fleischhauer).
173.
See PAUWELYN, supra note 145, at 421 (arguing that, in order to avoid the
declaration of a non liquet nullifying the conflicting treaties or treaty provisions, "(s]tates
should then realise that it will not suffice to let potential conflicts linger without political
solution").
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often defer to Congress's views. 174 As Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer demonstrates, this practice, at least in theory,
privileges legislative decision-making as a better proxy for
75
determining the people's will.'
In the case of the Security Council, decisions about
intervention are a matter of political choice that is not
constrained by international law. Article 39 can be interpreted at
the Council's discretion. If understood as a norm conflict between
sovereignty and humanitarian protection, international law
provides no hierarchy that resolves which norm should prevail.
There are potentially different means available for resolving the
norm conflict through interpretation, but arguably, the situation
presents a non liquet. Yet, even in the case of a non liquet, as
Part IV will argue, international law has a role to play. It
organizes decision-makers' choices by providing international
law's purposive intent.
IV. INVOKING LAW's PURPOSIVE INTENT
This Part argues that even in the event of a non liquet,
international law can inform the Security Council's choices about
intervention by providing purposive intent, which creates a
common value that guides decision-making by providing a
unifying way to think about what should be done. Furthermore,
this Part seeks to demonstrate that there is significant support
for understanding the purpose of international law to be the
promotion of peace. The purposive intent framework is not the
answer to the norm conflict; it does not offer the ultimate legal
solution for resolving the tensions described here. Instead,
purposive intent is a decision-making tool. It provides a
mechanism for international law to guide decisions by providing
a basis for political choices about which priorities to emphasize.
174.
For an example outside of the Article II context, see United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), which explains that the Court should generally
defer to the policy choices of politically accountable legislatures, except in situations
where there is reason to suspect that political remedies will not adequately protect
constitutional commitments-e.g., where legislatures target "discrete and insular
minorities" with limited political power.
175.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (identifying three "zones" of presidential authority with regard to
conducting foreign affairs). However, not all of the Justices agreed with this deferential
approach. See id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the President
possesses powers that, though not enumerated in the Constitution, are constitutionally
sound because of longstanding "systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned"); id. at 683-84, 710 (Vinson, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the deferential approach and finding on different grounds
that the President acts constitutionally unless and until Congress affirmatively
disapproves).

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

886

[51:3

Decisions about intervention must be grounded by the purpose of
promoting peace.
A.

The Concept of Purposive Intent

Every legal system is built upon values. As Higgins explains,
"[i]nternational law is not rules. It is a normative
17 6
system... harnessed to the achievement of common values.)
Legal scholars Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld argued that
"[l]aw is rooted in shared values and shared purposes." 177 Thus,
the concept of purposive intent is the idea that law's purpose
forms the foundation upon which the international legal
infrastructure
of (a) principles,
(b) norms, (c) rules, and
(d) decision-making procedures are based. 17 8 Purpose is used to
formulate standards of state behavior, provide procedures for
interpreting such behavior, and provide procedures for
17 9
implementing such interpretations.
In the decision-making context, law's purposiveness provides
guidance for decisionmakers that informs the choices they
make. 8 0 Decision-makers should look to the purpose of
international law when making determinations about whether or
not to intervene in a particular crisis. As legal scholar Mary
Ellen O'Connell explains, this is because they
must take the sources of law as the authoritative starting
points... [which] in international law [means starting]
with treaties, 4 customary international law and general principles of law. To the extent the law is
ambiguous or needs updating, the decision-maker should

176.
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and
Resolution of Disputes: General Course on Public InternationalLaw, in 230 RECUEIL DES
COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23, 23-24

(1991); see HART, supra note 21, at 84 ("Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing
obligations when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure
brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great.").
177.
1 CHAYES, EHRLICH & LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at xiv.

178.

Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as

Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 5th ed. 1989)
(offering a typology of norms for use in a definition of regimes); see also FRIEDRICH V.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 181-98 (1989) (discussing the interaction
and relationship between principles, rules, and the law in the context of third party
decision-making).
179.
CHARLES 0. LERCHE, JR. & ABDUL A. SAID, CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 170-71 (2d ed. 1970).
180. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW xci-xcii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.

Frickey eds., 1994) (describing Hart and Sack's Theory of Reasoned Elaboration, which
posits that where rules or statutes do not provide adequate guidance to decision-makers
about what to do in a given situation, the law's purposiveness should).
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look first to the purposes of the relevant law. Decisionmakers must also bear in mind the purpose of law generally
181
and the values of international society.
Therefore, decisions about intervention should be based on
thoughtful and explicit consideration of the underlying norms for
intervening or not, which should be based on the ultimate
purpose of international law. 182 As legal scholar Rosa Brooks
explains,
[t]he international rule of law hinges on the existence of a
shared lexicon accepted by states and other actors in the
international system. With no independent judicial system
capable of determining (and enforcing) the meaning of
words and concepts, states must develop shared
interpretations of the law and the concepts and terms it
relies on, and be willing (mostly) to abide by those shared

interpretations. 183
In order to achieve this aim, decision-makers need to understand
the relationship between and among the norms underlying
intervention, including misassumptions about the relationship
184
among violence, conflict, law and order.
The idea of purposive intent is rooted in theoretical
understandings about how law informs behavior through its
functions and procedures, and through the normative influence of
its processes. The origins of this school of thought can be found in
the work of Hart and Sacks, who pioneered the American Legal
Process School in the 1950s as a way to think about a dynamic
public law that considers law's purposiveness, the coordination of
institutions, and the legitimizing role of procedure. 8 5 This school
181.
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Legal Process School, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 797, T 18, at 800 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
182.
See Brooks, supra note 9, at 2285 ("The rule of law is not something that exists
'beyond culture' and that can be somehow added to an existing culture by the simple
expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting constitutions and statutes. In its

substantive sense, the rule of law is a culture, yet the human-rights-law and foreignpolicy communities know very little-and manifest little curiosity-about the complex
processes by which cultures are created and changed.").
183. Rosa Brooks, Drones and the InternationalRule of Law, 28 ETHICS & INT'L AFF.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.educgiviewcontent.
cgi?article=2296&context=facpub.
184.
See Brooks, supra note 9, at 2339 ("[This Article] also suggests that before we
will be able to intervene effectively to change the degree and distribution of violence in
conflict-ridden societies, we will need to let go of some of our basic assumptions about the
relationship between law, order, and violence.").
185.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
liii (explaining
Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 180, at li,
that legal process theory "went well beyond the traditional law story" to describe law as
"essential to the satisfaction of basic human wants and needs and to the advancement of
humankind").
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emphasized that understanding process was essential in
determining what law is and what it ought to be. 186 Their work
influenced and was influenced by the New Haven School (NHS),
where Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell highlighted policy
approaches that focused on public law, arguing that "the most
viable conception of law ... [is] that of a process of authoritative
decision by which the members of a community clarify and secure
18 7
their common interests."
Influenced by ALP and NHS, Abram Chayes, Thomas
Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld introduced International Legal
Process (ILP) theory in the 1960s.1 88 ILP examines the extent to
which international legal processes influence decision-making in
international affairs, asking "[h]ow-and how far-do law,
lawyers, and legal institutions operate to affect the course of
186.
See id. at xciv ("[A] procedure 'which is soundly adapted to the type of power to
be exercised is conducive to well-informed and wise decisions. An unsound procedure
invites ill-informed and unwise ones."' (quoting HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 173 (1958));
see also HART & SACKS, supra note 180, at 646-47 (examining types of disputes suitable
and not suitable for adjudication as a method of settlement); Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-85 (1976) (arguing that
the "traditional conception of adjudication" established the courts as "an adjunct to
private ordering, whose primary function was the resolution of disputes about the fair
implications of individual actions" but that in "modern federal litigation ... lawsuits do
not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the object
of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."); Owen M. Fiss, The

Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)
(defining adjudication as "the social process by which judges give meaning to our public
values" and describing structural reform as a "type of adjudication, distinguished by the
constitutional character of the public values, and.., by the fact that it involves an
encounter between the judiciary and the state bureaucracies"); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 354 (1978) (defining adjudication to
include "adjudicative bodies which owe their powers to the consent of the litigants
expressed in an agreement of submission, as in labor relations and in international law").
187.
1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY xxi (1992); see also Myres S. McDougal,
Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 108-109 (1952) (arguing that people identify and
demand values "that transcend national boundaries because they have come to know that
the conditions under which they can secure their values transcend such boundaries," that
in order to obtain these values they organize institutions that range from governments to
political parties and private associations, and that "[d]ecisions which affect the world
distribution of power and other values are made at all points in this complicated matrix of
inter-related institutions .... ").
188.
See 1 CHAYES, EHRLICH & LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at xi (discussing "[t]he
study of the international legal process itself' and noting that "[flor an adequate
understanding of the norm we need to see. . . by what institutions and procedures it is
brought to bear in particular cases"); see also Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter,

Appraising the Methods of InternationalLaw: A Prospectusfor Readers, in THE METHODS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1, 6 (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds., 2004)
(noting that international legal process as developed by Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld
"has seen the key locus of inquiry of international law as the role of law in constraining
decision makers and affecting the course of international affairs").
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international affairs?"'18 9 Abram and Antonia Chayes later
introduced the concept of "managerial" ILP, arguing that
compliance with international law should focus on cooperation,
capacity-building, and problem solving. 190 Harold Koh extended
ILP by considering the "transnational" dimension of interplay
between domestic actors and nations. 191 Koh and subsequent
theorists argued that process matters in international law
because it creates and changes norms, which became known as
192
New International Legal Process (NILP).
The NILP approach envisions that decision-makers will
assume their roles in a manner that is timely and reflects the
range of values "still to be distilled from many different
participants in the international community, and will thus make
should
new law."' 93 NILP is suited for addressing problems that
94
be informed by normative concerns and global values.1
In addition to ALP, ILP, and NILP, the purposive intent
95
model is informed by literature on "dynamic" decision-making.
The following approaches show how decision-makers, typically
judges or legislatures, should use the law to inform their
decision-making: formalist (Constitution vests authority in
Congress), economic (statutes are contracts to be enforced), and
legal process (it is illegitimate for nonelected judges to make
policy in a majoritarian political system).' 96 Eskridge introduced
189.
See 1 CHAYES, EHRLICH & LOWENFELD, supra note 19, at xi.
190.
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22-28 (1995).
191.
See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 18384 (1996) (explaining transnational legal process as describing "the theory and practice of
how public and private actors.., interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of
transnational law").
192.
See Koh, supra note 191, at 188 (describing the critical reaction to the Legal
Process movement that "viewed lawmaking as not merely the rubberstamping of a
pluralistic political process, but as a process of value-creation in which courts, agencies,
and the people engage in a process of democratic dialogue"); O'Connell, supra note 19, at
338 (discussing the emergence of the NILP approach, with an "agenda ...to balance form
and substance, to view the legal system as a purposive whole, and to explore both
functionally and formally institutional competence and the role of process").
193.
Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, The Method Is the Message, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 410, 418-19 (1999) (describing the NILP approach to legal prescription).
Id. at 420, 422.
194.
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 185, at xci-xcii (setting forth a purpose195.
based approach to statutory interpretation); see also Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1496
(arguing for the use of purposive intent by institutional decision-makers).
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1479, 1481 ("Statutes... should ... be interpreted
196.
'dynamically,' that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context."
(footnote omitted)); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship
and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 695-96 (1987)
(explaining that the Hart and Sacks approach to statutory interpretation rested upon the
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a fourth approach, dynamic decision-making, to be used when the
law is obsolete or the circumstances have materially changed. 197
He envisions decision-makers "as diplomats, whose ordering
authority is severely limited but who must often update their
orders to meet changing circumstances."' 198 His idea built upon
Hart and Sacks's earlier "intentionalism" model.1 99 It also built
upon Dworkin's model that decision-making should be driven by
200
law's "integrity" when legal rules develop and change.
Dworkin argued that "integrity in legislation... is so much
part of our political practice that no competent interpretation of

that practice can ignore

it."201

Integrity in decision-making

requires those making legal rules to strive for moral coherence
among them as "propositions of law are true if they figure in or
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due
process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice."202 Dynamic decision-making
integrates moral meaning and public standards into acts of
interpreting law. Judges, for example, "should decide hard cases
by interpreting the political structure of their community ... by
trying to find the best justification they can find, in principles of
political morality, for the structure as a whole." 20 3 Following this
approach requires "accommodation among bearers of conflicting
interests and values. 20 4
assumptions that statutes have rational purposes and that judges can find and apply those
purposes).
197.
Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1481 ("[S]tatutes, like the Constitution and the common
law, should be interpreted dynamically.... Even under... conventional assumptions,
however, original legislative expectations should not always control statutory meaning. This is
especially true when the statute is old and generally phrased and the societal or legal context
of the statute has changed in material ways.').
198.
Id. at 1482, 1484 ('The dynamic model, however, views the evolutive perspective as
most important when the statutory text is not clear and the original legislative expectations
have been overtaken by subsequent changes in society and law. In such cases, the pull of text
and history will be slight, and the interpreter will find current policies and societal conditions
most important. The hardest cases, obviously, are those in which a clear text or strong
historical evidence or both, are inconsistent with compelling current values and policies.").
199.
Id. at 1481-82, 1544-45 (explaining the dynamic model as exhibiting similarities to
Hart and Sacks's approach but also differing in key ways and thus providing a superior
alternative).
200.
See id. at 1549-54 (expressing deep appreciation for Dworkin's "law as integrity"
theory but also doubts as to whether the 'legislative principle of integrity [is] a fair statement
of our political morality).
201.
See id. at 1549 (quoting RONALD DWORK[N, LAW'S EMPIRE 175-76 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
202.
See id. (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 201, at 225) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
203. Ronald A. Dworkin, 'Natural"Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982).
204. ROTH, supra note 153, at 11 (arguing that this makes it necessary to favor
principle over process).
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Although the Security Council is not a judicial body, it does
have both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative features. 20 It is a
decision-making body vested with the international legal
authority to make binding decisions that express what the law is.
Therefore, although they will need to be adapted to the Council's
unique constitution, the theoretical concepts provided here serve
to illuminate the role that law's purpose can and should play in
shaping decisions about intervention. 20 6 When the rules are
uncertain and the norms are in conflict with each other, decisionwith the purpose, or
makers ought to align their decisions
20 7
conscious intent, of international law.
B. Peace as the Purpose of InternationalLaw
If choices about intervention ought to align with
international law's purposive intent, then what is the purpose of
international law? To be sure, there is no shared consensus in
international law about the answer to this question. However,
based on historical and theoretical support, this Subpart posits
that international law's central purpose, the reason for which it
was created and exists, is and always has been the promotion of
peace.
1. Historical Origins: Peace as a First Principle of
InternationalLaw. Peace is a first principle of international law
because it has always been a fundamental aim of the law. 20 8 For
205.
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 25, at 257-63 (describing the UNSC's role in
identifying breaches to the peace pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter as quasijudicial and describing some of the Council's recent resolutions, such as Resolution 1373
(2001) as created through quasi-legislative process).
See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1549 (discussing Dworkin's influence);
206.
O'Connell, supra note 19, at 335, 338 (describing the development of legal process theory).
Brooks, supra note 9, at 2283 ('The very concept of the rule of law is rarely
207.
examined or understood by key U.S. and international decisionmakers, although
'promoting the rule of law' has become a mantra for many in the foreign-policy, humanand
communities.... Decisionmakers
and
international-development
rights,
commentators tend to conflate formal and procedural aspects of the rule of law (such as
structurally independent courts, 'modernized' legislation, etc.) with a more substantive
conception (such as respect for individual and minority rights, a commitment to
nonviolent means of resolving disputes, substantive due process, and so on)." (footnotes
omitted)); John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71, 71
(1998) ('The Rule of Law is routinely prescribed these days for what ails the postCommunist World."); see also Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 95-96 (explaining that for rule-of-law reform to work, citizens must
be part of the process and "the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by
the law" must be addressed).
208.
Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 138
(2010) (assessing Immanuel Kant's argument that establishing eventual peace is the sole
justification for the resort to force).
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example, Roman law introduced concept of humanitas or "[t]he
humane tendency as an ethical commandment, benevolent
consideration for others."20 9 Hugo Grotius advanced this concept
into jus in bello and jus ad bellum,210 taking the view that those
laws could bind nations and encourage more humane behavior
among peoples. 211 He wrote that "[t]he disputes arising among
those who are held together by no common bond of civil laws to
decide their dissensions ...who formed no national community,
or the numerous unconnected communities.., all bear a relation
to the circumstances of war or peace." 2 12 This stimulated a new
way of thinking about the relationship between law and people
21 3
and the role of the nation-state in mediating that relationship.
These theoretical foundations influenced the subsequent
development of norms, rules, and practices to promote and
achieve peace through international law. 214 During the
negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Westphalia, the parties
negotiating the pax universalis professed to be ready for peace, if
conditions were met. 215 Certain practices became regularized that
helped to establish the norm of peace talks. 216 The comprehensive
209.
ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 489 (1953); see also
ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (William Whewell trans., 1853) (1589);
RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW 24-25 (2011); RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 34
(1999).

210.
H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 1, 35-39 (1946) (discussing jus ad bellum, the doctrine distinguishing wars that
are just and lawful from those that are not).
211.

HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 290 (A.C. Campbell trans.,

1901) (1625).

212. Id. at 17.
213.
TUCK, supra note 209, at 80-81 (observing that aggression by Dutch companies
in seeming violation of "some of the most fundamental principles of international
relations" forced Grotius to revise those principles in order to defend the Dutch actions,
and that "in the process... he fundamentally revised Western political thought itself').
See generally Martin van Gelderen, The Challenge of Colonialism: Grotius and Vitoria on
Natural Law and InternationalRelations, 14/15 GROTIANA 3 (1993-1994).
214.
See Lauterpacht, supra note 210, at 51 (observing the continuing impact of
Grotius' theories upon positive law).
215.
Konrad Repgen, Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia: A Survey with an
Examination of the Major Problems, in 1 1648-WAR AND PEACE IN EUROPE 355, 355
(Klaus Bussmann & Heinz Schilling eds., 1998) ("A condition of peace as the basic norm of
state relations between the Christian powers of Europe was generally not
questioned ...").
216.
Heinz Duchhardt, Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era, in
PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE
MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE 45, 52 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004) (showing that two
methods for peace talks emerged: direct bilateral dialogue and talks facilitated by
mediators, and that in some cases, all war parties were physically present in one location,
while in other instances secret diplomatic talks occurred prior to the formal meeting in
order to facilitate speedy outcomes).
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documentation of peace talks formed the ius publicum
Europaeum (European international law), helping to establish
the norm of ongoing negotiations as well as inform diplomats
who work from a standardized body of knowledge. 217 The
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 further established
the promotion of peace as a normative aim of international
law. 2 18 These two conferences helped "justify the belief that the
world has entered upon an orderly process through
which... there may be continual progress toward making the
practice of civilized nations conform to their peaceful
professions."21 9 This was a remarkable development given that
the parties began from a position
that two principles of public law are generally recognized
as fundamental. One is the perfect equality and entire
independence of all di[s]tinct States ....

This is the great

foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the
peace of mankind, both in their politic and private
220
capacities, to preserve inviolate.
The creation of the United Nations after World War II
solidified the promotion of peace as the aim of international
law as codified in the U.N. Charter. 221 During the negotiations
that led to the development of the U.N. Charter, there was
difficulty in determining how to improve the machinery for
"promoting conditions of peace by diminishing the sources of
conflict between nations. Politically, this was part of the

217.
See, e.g., GROTIUS, supra note 211, at 385-86 (describing former peace
talks).
218.
THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, xiv-xvi
(James Brown Scott ed., 1915) (detailing how the original conference came about
when Russia circulated a proposal for initiating such a peace conference, stating
"[tihe maintenance of general peace and a possible reduction of the excessive
armaments which weigh upon all nations present themselves, in the existing
condition of the whole world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all
The preservation of peace has been put forward
Governments should be directed ....
as the object of international policy.").
219.
S. DOc. No. 60-444, at 63 (1st Sess. 1908) (statement of Elihu Root, U.S.
Sec'y of State).
220.
Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (1817) ("The second is, that all nations
being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated
parts of the ocean for their navigation.").
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1; see supra note 20. The possibility of actually
221.
achieving peace has been a matter of philosophical debate. See Bernard R. Boxill, The
Duty to Seek Peace, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, July 2010, at 274, 274 (contrasting the views
of Kant, who "declared that 'seeking the state of peace' is 'a matter of unmitigated
duty' with those of Hobbes and those of Rousseau, who posited that "barring a world
state which would be practically impossible to establish, the best we could hope for
was a stand-off between countries deterred from attacking each other out of fear of
devastating retaliation-a situation which was still a state of war").
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general problem of enforcing peace, which ... ran into the
dilemma of what to do about states not fulfilling their
' 222
undertakings to settle dispute peacefully."
Several approaches emerged. The first was the creation of
the Council of the World Organization (which would become the
Security Council) that would have the authority to advise states
on what it considered necessary to reach peace. 223 There was also
a proposed Equity Tribunal and the requirement that "all
members [be] obligated to settle peacefully, by means of their
own choice, any disputes that might threaten international peace
and security. '224 The negotiating history provides context for
understanding the challenges nations faced in defining the
obligation to promote peace and creating the necessary

institutional frameworks for doing

So.

2 25

2. Understanding Peace as Sovereignty's Purpose. Further
historical analysis reveals an essential yet obscure connection
between the principle of peace and the concept of sovereignty. The
development of sovereignty as a legal concept advanced the
international community's aim of promoting peace, thus
226
cementing this aim as the purposive intent of international law.
In Roman law, the authority of the state was derived from summa
potestas, or the idea that a political community's power was based
on the unlimited obedience of its citizens. 227 During the Middle
Ages in Europe, the legal concept of sovereignty began to formalize
as a mechanism for maintaining social order. 228 French
philosopher Jean Bodin used the term "sovereignty" to describe
this relationship of authority between the people and the state. 229
222.
RUSSELL & MUTHER, supranote 99, at 210.
223.
Id. at 278-82.
224. Id. at 286.
225.
Id. at 286-87 (finding that a blanket obligation to settle disputes would
unnecessarily engender international tension as a result of minor disputes).
226.
Scholars have acknowledged the relationship between peace and sovereignty.
See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION

OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 11-12 (2009) ('The animating vision behind the
shift to territorial division was stability and peace."); Cohen, supra note 139, at 12
("Inherent in this conception of sovereign equality, the newly generalized principle of
nonintervention, together with strictures regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes
and the principle of nonaggression in the UN Charter, are meant to protect state
sovereignty while also limiting it."); Hinsley, supra note 131, at 283-88 (describing the
need for international law that governs peace).
227.
CAMILLERI & FALK, supranote 126, at 16.
228.
The term "sovereignty" was coined and defined in 1576 by the French political
philosopher Jean Bodin. BODIN, supra note 126, at 25; see also LAUREN BENTON, A
SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400-1900, at

287-88 (2010).
229.
See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 126, at 16.
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After the Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War, the
concept of sovereignty took on meaning as nations began to
recognize each other's sovereignty and respect a sovereign's
right, as a matter of law, to protect its territory from external
threats and to permit its people the right to practice the religion
of that domain. 230 The treaties that ended these wars and
established a new order are known collectively as the Peace of
Westphalia. 231 These treaties have become some of the most oftcited doctrinal sources of sovereignty, even though there is no
explicit definition for sovereignty in the treaties. 232 Their
translation into the vernacular languages of Italian, Swedish,
German, and French was novel for the times and fraught with
challenges in trying to describe the then-emerging concept of
sovereignty. 233 For example, sovereignty, as a legal term, was
used in French constitutional law, but it did not exist in Imperial
Law. 234 So in negotiating the clause of cession over areas of
authority, France used the recognized juridical term of
superioritassublime territoriijus, or "territorial superiority," but
also referred to a jus supreme dominii, or the "law of supreme
dominion," to denote sovereignty. 235 The 1648 German
translation uses the words Herrschaften and Herrschaft, which
represent both the concept of authority as well as a formal title
("The Sovereign"), respectively. 236 It further provides that all
See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of
230.
Sovereignty, 21 INT'L HIST. REV. 569, 579 (1999) ('The emphasis on territory in the peace
of Westphalia may be evidence for a changing conception of the state from rule over
people to rule over territory, but is hardly a definitive indication of sovereign statehood.").
The treaties that ended the Thirty Years' War include the 1648 Peace of Munster
231.
(PM) between the Dutch Republic and Spain; the Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (IPO)
between the Holy Roman Emperor and Sweden and their allies; and the Instrumentum
Pacis Monasteriensis (IPM) between the Holy Roman Emperor and Spain and their allies on
October 24, 1648. Id. at 569; Marcilio Toscano Franca Filho, Westphalia: A Paradigm?A
Dialogue Between Law, Art, and Philosophy of Science, 8 GER. L.J. 955, 963 & n.38 (2007).
The IPM preamble provides that the treaty is being negotiated as a result of an internal war
in the Holy Roman Empire that has taken over the stakeholders, including Germany and
France. Treaty of Westphalia, Between Holy Roman Empire and France, Oct. 24, 1648,
I.S.N., reprinted in MILESTONE DOCUMENTS IN WORLD HISTORY 722 (2010).
Croxton, supra note 230, at 569, 581-82.
232.
See, e.g., id. at 573-74 (noting that the German and French translations of the
233.
Latin term "ius territoriale" diverged from each other as well as modern notions of
sovereignty).
Repgen, supra note 215, at 367.
234.
235.
Id.
Treaty of Westphalia art. III (German trans. 1649) (1648), available at
236.
http://www.pax-westphaca.de/ (IPM and IPO). Translation assistance was provided by
Professor Helmut Muller-Sievers, Professor of German and Director of the Center for the
Humanities and Arts at the University of Colorado. Professor Muller.Sievers holds an MA in
German and Latin Literature from FU Berlin (1985) and a Ph.D. in German and the
Humanities from Stanford (1990).
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Dukes should have free use of Juris Territorialis(the right of the
237
land) over religious and worldly aspects.
This historical context is essential to understanding the role
that the emerging concept of sovereignty played in the
development of international law and the promotion of peace.
Both Bodin and Hobbes viewed the development of sovereignty
necessary as a means for creating public order. 238 In Bodin's
view, sovereignty was defined as a grant of absolute power so
that a state may restore order-souverainetM, majestas, summa
potestas-and that this authority was indivisible. 239 His ideas
were derived from the Roman legal doctrines of imperium and
legibus solutus. 240 Bodin's driving priority was the urgency for
internal order and peace. In Hobbes's view, sovereignty is
necessarily absolute because people are incapable of cooperation

without

it.241

Hobbes believed that, if left alone, society would

devolve into chaos and conflict as "man to man is an arrant
wolf';242 his view of sovereignty was that it needed to impart the
power and authority to maintain order in these dismal
conditions. 243 This early focus on achieving public order was
driven by the then-existing context in Europe that peace required
237.
Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis § 62 (German trans. 1649) (1648),
available at http://www.pax-westphalica.de/; Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis art. VIII
(German trans. 1649) (1648), available at http://www.pax-westphalica.de/;
see
Instrumentum Pacis Monasteriensis § 118 (illustrating the difficulty that the negotiators
must have faced in trying to convince one another that their respective areas should be
entitled to exclusive authority over their territory as a matter of agreement bound by
law); Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis art. XVII (same); Croxton, supra note 230, at
570 ("No piece of paper can ever establish exclusive authority ....The most the paper can
do is convince people that states ought to have exclusive territorial authority."); see also
John Gerard Ruggie, Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a
Neorealist Synthesis, 35 WORLD POL. 261, 276 (1983) (stating that sovereignty "signifies a
form of legitimation").
238.
BODIN, supra note 126, at 199-200 (arguing that people are predisposed to
submit to a single, powerful leader); see also HOBBES, supra note 126, at 110-11 (arguing
that people submit to a sovereign's authority to avoid a state of constant war, and offering
reasons why individuals cannot avoid war without a sovereign).
239.
See BODIN, supra note 126, at 25-27; CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 126, at 18.
But note that Bodin was an early believer that sovereignty was a legal relationship
between the ruler and the subject not necessarily linked to territory. See BODIN, supra
note 126, at 25-28. This view has been taken up by geographers. See, e.g., THE
DICTIONARY OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 744-45 (Derek Gregory et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009)
(referring to geographic control as an aspect of human territoriality).
240.
See Donald Kelley, The Influence of Roman Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 156, 157 (George Klosko ed., 2011); see also
BODIN, supra note 126, at 44-45; ROTH, supranote 153, at 18.
241.
GEORGE SHELTON, MORALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES
227 (1992).

242.

THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 1 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., 1949) (1651).

243.

Id. at 13-14; THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC

104-05 (Ferdinand Tinnies ed., 1889); SHELTON, supra note 241, at 218.
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a clear division of power vested in states. 244 To prevent interstate
clashes, it made sense to provide legal protection for each state to
have absolute sovereign control over its domains. This
understanding held for several centuries, and it was codified in
245
the Covenant of the League of Nations almost 300 years later.
This historical view into the relationship between peace and
sovereignty shows an interdependent relationship: sovereignty
promoted peace between nations, and peace incentivized a legal
system built on sovereignty. But the central difference now is
that we have shifted from a world in which peace had to be
secured between states to one in which peace must be secured
within the state between peoples. 246 This shift demands
revisiting what the purpose of international law and the
promotion of peace means amid changed circumstances.
3. Peace as International Law's Grundnorm. A useful
conceptual framework for considering the promotion of peace as
the purpose of international law is Hans Kelsen's theory of the
Grundnorm. Kelsen argued that in all legal systems there is one
basic norm, the Grundnorm, that is nonpositivist, rooted in moral
and legal authority, and serves to unify all other norms. 247 Kelsen
believed that "[t]he basic norms must be considered self-evident."
It is objective. It has not been invented. Writing during WWII,
Kelsen further posited that the Grundnorm for international law
was peace and that "war or any other use of force [could] be
prevented within the international community" by uniting
individual states into a "world-state. 248
As Grundnorm, the promotion of peace would serve to unify
all other norms of international law. 249 This would then require
244.
Cutler, supra note 140, at 134-35 (noting that the Thirty Years' War ended with
the Peace of Westphalia, the birth of international law, and the emerging state system).
245.
League of Nations Covenant art. 15.
246.

See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 11-24

(1990) (discussing the evolution of legitimacy of a state in the context of the shifting
dynamic of international law); HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 16-18 (2000 ed.) (1944)
(arguing that all individual states should be united to secure world peace).
247.
See KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 21, at 58-59, 111, 116; KELSEN, PURE
THEORY, supra note 21, at 8-10. But see HART, supra note 21, at 292-93 nn. 1-4 (arguing
against Kelsen's Grundnorm on several grounds).
248.
KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE, supra note 21, at 27; see also Hans Kelsen, Collective
Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INTL L.
783, 788-89 (1948) (describing Kelsen's view that the U.N.'s mechanisms for collective security
were meant to enforce peace in addition to law); Hans Kelsen, The Preamble of the Charter-A
CriticalAnalysis, 8 J. POL. 134, 157 (1946) (commenting that Members of the United Nations
are obligated to settle disputes through peaceful means); see also ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note
6, at 16-19 (discussing the character of the enforcement actions of the U.N. Charter).
249.

See THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: AN

INTRODUCTION 40-41 (1998) (observing that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter formulated
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that "[cjoercive acts ought to be performed under the conditions
and in the manner which the historically first constitution, and
the norms created according to it, prescribe." 250 In other words,
the purpose of intervention would be to promote peace. An
intervention capable of achieving this aim would be in concert
with international law's purposive intent, whereas an
intervention that would escalate violence and frustrate the aim of
peace would not. Although there are serious critiques about the
viability of Kelsen's Grundnorm theory, it does offer an
important framework for understanding the basis for and
implications of conceptualizing the promotion of peace as
251
international law's purposive intent.
V. INTERVENING FOR PEACE
The purposive intent approach asks whether intervention, or
alternatively, nonintervention furthers the aim of promoting
peace. Adopting this view has complex implications worthy of
more exposition than this Article provides. The aim here is
modest. This Part identifies two challenges and offers some
preliminary perspectives about how to overcome them. First, the
promotion of peace must be defined such that it becomes a useful
analytical concept capable of guiding decisions about whether
and when to intervene. Second, determining whether or not to
intervene for the purpose of promoting peace will require the
Security Council to adapt its decision-making practices and
operations.
A. Defining Peace
A central conceptual challenge that the purposive intent
decision-making framework highlights, and must overcome, is
that there is no definition of peace or shared understanding
about what it means to promote peace under international law.
How peace is defined directly impacts the Council's
responsibilities. In the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, for example, should the Council's choices aim to
restrict war, should the Council try to promote security in order
peace as the norm of international law and that norms are a fundamental concept in the
development of the law).
250.
Raz, supra note 21, at 97.
251.
See id. at 99 (arguing that Kelsen's theory "cannot solve the problem of identity
and unity of legal systems" and that "[t]here is nothing in the theory to prevent two legal
systems from applying to the same territory"); see also H.L.A. Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of
the Unity of Law, in ETHICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 171, 171-94 (Howard E. Kiefer & Milton
K. Munitz eds., 1970).
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to protect civilian lives, or should the Council aim to help
establish the conditions for political solutions that can establish
long-term peace? The purpose behind the Council's choices rests
on the definition of peace and the Council's obligations regarding
peace. The lack of clarity results in confusion about the reasons for
intervention and intervention's putative role in promoting
252
peace.
The U.N. Charter, the main treaty-based source of modern
international law, uses "peace" throughout but does not define the
term. 253 The Charter does clarify the purposes of the U.N. 254 There
is no affirmative obligation upon states under international law to
promote peace, per se. Instead, the Charter obligates states to
refrain from using force, unless in self-defense, and requires that
states undertake peaceful means for settling disputes. 25 5 The
Charter also provides that the Security Council holds the primary
responsibility for taking measures necessary "to maintain or
restore international peace and security.''256 Seeking to provide
clarification, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Essentials of
Peace resolution in 1949, which declared
that the Charter of the United Nations, the most solemn
pact of peace in history, lays down basic principles
252.
See Spain, supra note 18, at 330 (noting that the U.N. Charter's absence of
definitions of "peace" and "security" has caused "decades of debate about the meanings of
these important terms"); see also Klinton W. Alexander, Ignoring the Lessons of the Past:
The Crisis in Darfur and the Case for HumanitarianIntervention, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POLVY 1, 43 (2005) (arguing that the Security Council's failure to intervene in Darfur was

a breach of both legal and moral obligations); Boxill, supra note 221, at 281-82
(evaluating Immanuel Kant's observation that the hardships of war will lead even selfinterested people to enter into a pacific federation of states largely out of "prudence, fear,
and material self-interest").
253.
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility,
73-85, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004) [hereinafter A More Secure World]
(discussing the need for a new and more comprehensive definition of collective security).
254. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1; see supra note 20; see also The United Nations at a
Glance, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/enlaboutunlindex.shtml (last visited Feb. 5,
2014) (identifying the maintenance of peace as the first goal of the United Nations).
255. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4 (calling all Members to settle disputes peacefully
and to refrain from the use of force); id. art. 33, paras. 1-2 (providing the available
peacemaking mechanisms); id. art. 37, para. 1 (requiring parties to a dispute to refer the
matter to the UNSC if peacemaking mechanisms fail); see also Greenwood, supra note
100, at 60-61 (observing restrictions on use of force as the means by which the U.N.
Charter supports peace).
256. U.N. Charter art. 24 ("In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."); id. art. 39 ('The
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.").

900

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:3

necessary for an enduring peace; that disregard of these
principles is primarily responsible for the continuance of
international tension; and that it is urgently necessary for
all Members to act in accordance with these principles in
the spirit of co-operation on which the United Nations was

founded.

257

One interpretation of this guidance is that "the concept of peace
is firmly premised on the observance of fundamental principles of
international law, and that compliance with international law is
a condition for peace. 258
Despite the UNGA's assertion, the Charter does not provide
the Security Council with adequate guidance about what is
necessary for an enduring peace. The Security Council's
motivations for authorizing intervention or other actions are
based on multiple objectives, ranging from humanitarian
concerns, regime change, the protection of national security, the
promotion of human rights, and other basic principles of
international law and the enforcement of international law. The
general principles in the Charter do not explain how these aims
align with the promotion of peace. Furthermore, despite the
complex infrastructure of U.N. bodies, intergovernmental
organizations, regional arrangements, and multilateral alliances
that engage in peace promotion activities, this rich practice has
not resulted in a shared consensus about what promoting peace

means or how to achieve

it.259

For these and other reasons, it is imperative that the
international community revisit the task of defining peace and
what it means to engage in the promotion of peace under
international law. A definition is a prerequisite to the Council's
ability to make responsible determinations about if and when
forceful interventions are necessary. Historically, the concept of
peace was understood in the negative, as the absence of violence
or war. 260 Today, in light of new practical and theoretical
understandings about how to build and promote peace effectively,
the concept has taken on new meaning. 261 According to Galtung,
257.
G.A. Res. 290 (V),
1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/67/290 (Dec. 1, 1949).
258.
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 6, at 19.
259.
See id. at 288-335 (describing the framework for peace operations at the U.N.);
see, e.g., A More Secure World, supra note 253,
5, 28, 30 (discussing the need for a new
and more comprehensive definition of collective security).
260.
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, From Just War to False Peace, 13 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 1, 35 (2012) (interpreting Article 1 as meaning that "the central purpose of the
Charter is to prevent war, not promote justice or correct justice").
261.
BERCOVITCH & JACKSON, supra note 53, at 169-71; see also Johan Galtung,
Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding,in 2 PEACE,
WAR AND DEFENCE: ESSAYS IN PEACE RESEARCH 282, 282-304 (Christian Ejlers ed., 1975);
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peace defined in the "positive" is understood as promoting the
conditions necessary for the development of long-term,
sustainable conditions marked not only by the absence of
widespread violence but also by the presence of security, the
fulfillment of basic human needs, social justice, human rights,
262
and effective governance.
To propose a further definition that creates legal rights and
obligations remains the task of nations. However, my own view is
that saving lives is not, on its own, a justification for using force.
When saving lives becomes essential to the objective of building
up the conditions necessary for long-term, stable peace, then the
use of force aligns with the purpose of promoting peace.
Naturally, the question of what constitutes the right amount and
the right kind of force remains. But, under my view, the
prevention of genocide or crimes against humanity becomes a
justifiable reason for the Security Council to authorize forceful
intervention for the following reason. The Council cannot very
well fulfill its mandate of restoring or maintaining international
peace when such egregious violations of a culture of international
peace are allowed to occur unchecked. The Council does not have
to stop genocide, but it does have to try. Acts like this destabilize
the very infrastructure of international law and the values upon
which it is based.
This interpretation of the standard-intervention must align
with the promotion of peace understood to be the promotion of
conditions necessary for a long-term societal stability where
nonviolence becomes the norm-will be unsatisfactory to many.
This view does not readily lend itself to allowing for forceful
intervention aimed at regime change, for example, to address

human

rights

violations.

Nor

should

it.263

However

unsatisfactory, the international legal system offers other options
for redress. The use of force should not be the dominant means
for achieving these goals. 264 Furthermore, the individuals
Diane Marie Amann, InternationalLaw and the Future of Peace 4-6 (Univ. of Georgia Sch. of
2013),
available at
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
2013-15,
Law
Research
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2245372.
262.
JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT
AND CIVILIZATION 2 (1996) (explaining the concept of positive peace, a concept that Galtung is
credited for introducing); see also JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE
RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997); DIETER SENGHAAS, ON PERPETUAL PEACE: A
TIMELY ASSESSMENT 33-42 (Ewald Osers trans., 2007).
263.
Alexander, supra note 252, at 13 ('CThe framers of the [U.N.] Charter did not envision
Members interfering in the internal affairs of other Members to prevent human rights
violations short of genocide.")
264.
See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 71 (arguing that the current paradigm of
intervention is premised upon the notion that force is the dominant means by which to
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responsible for intervening are ill-equipped with the skills and
265
vision necessary to achieve more diverse, nonmilitary goals.
Perhaps, in time, intervention can evolve to serve these aims.
However, given the present circumstances, the UNSC should not
authorize military-led interventions on the basis of wrongful acts
or humanitarian crises unless they pose a serious risk to the
establishment of a positive peace.
B. Deciding for Peace
The prevailing paradigm of intervention today is one that is
associated with the use of military force. The existing
authorizations provided for in international law have been built
around a contextual understanding that war occurs between
nations, and, further, that the use of force, acts of aggression,
and the state machinery of militarized war, are threats to be
prevented. 266 For the average person, intervention has become
synonymous with air strikes, bombing campaigns, and, more
recently, drones. Military leaders are called upon to answer
tactical questions. Can our missiles strike targets accurately to
ensure no civilian casualties? Will our intelligence still be good in
two weeks? Can we change course and back a different political
leader?
But what if the vision of intervention was different? 26 7 What
if
peacebuilders,
mediators,
medical
personnel,
and
humanitarian aid workers were in charge? What if the focus was
promoting peace instead of using force? With this vision in mind,
what changes would the Council need to undertake in order to
build capacity for conducting interventions that sought to
promote peace? What would the Security Council need to reform
in order to decide for peace?
achieve desired goals); see also SEYBOLT, supra note 47, at 276 ("It is necessary to be
ruthlessly modest about what humanitarian intervention can do. It can, under the right
circumstances, 'stop the dying' in the short term and it can protect some fundamental
human rights.").
265.
Karl W. Eikenberry, The Limits of CounterinsurgencyDoctrine in Afghanistan:
The Other Side of the COIN, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2013, at 59, 64 ('CThe U.S.
intervention required improvisation in a distant, mountainous land with de jure, but not
de facto, sovereignty; a traumatized and divided population; and staggering political,
economic, and social problems. Achieving even minimal strategic objectives in such a
context was never going to be quick, easy, or cheap.... The typical 21-year-old marine is
hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to
do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?").
266.
KELSEN, supra note 246, at 3 ('CTo guarantee peace the social order does not
exclude all kinds of coercive acts; it authorizes certain individuals to perform such acts
under certain conditions.").
267.
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS--THE PATH NOT TAKEN:
USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY viii (2006).
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First, who decides matters. 268 The problem with the current
decision-making process is that those with nonmilitary ideas for
intervention are not a part of the decision-making process early,
enough, or early enough. While the UNSC holds the ultimate
authority regarding decisions affecting international peace and
security, several other institutions have greater capacity to
inform decision-making about building long-term peace in
noninternational armed conflicts. 269 Among these are U.N.
Peacekeeping, 270 the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, 271 and the
U.N. Mediation Support Unit.272 They share the same purposive
intent as the UNSC. 273 Yet, the organic evolution of different
institutions within the U.N., populated with people who come
from diverse national and disciplinary backgrounds, has resulted
in institutional rivalries, struggles to "add value," and flawed
relations with the UNSC, which remains the ultimate authority
2 74
on all matters pertaining to international peace and security.
MINTz & DEROUEN, supra note 3, at 18-21; VERTZBERGER, supra note 3, at 66268.
79; Brooks, supra note 9, at 2334 ("And to a significant extent, the governmental and
intergovernmental bureaucrats involved in these interventions (and the NGO actors as
well) fall back on previously existing understandings and consensus about goals-which
means that more theoretical discussion of goals, abstracted from a given conflict or
transition, may help ensure that interventions can get off the ground quickly and
effectively.").
See, e.g., Spain, supra note 18, at 331 (describing how the Security Council
269.
delegated decisions in Libya's recent internal conflict to the Sanctions Committee because
of the Sanctions Committee's superior decision-making capacity); see also S.C. Res. 1970,
24, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
270.
"In addition to maintaining peace and security, peacekeepers are increasingly
charged with assisting in political processes; reforming judicial systems; training law
enforcement and police forces; disarming and reintegrating former combatants; [and]
supporting the return of internally displaced persons and refugees." About Us, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/enlpeacekeeping/about/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2014).
271.
S.C. Res. 1645, 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005) (providing that the
Peacebuilding Commission operates as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC with the mandate
"[t]o bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery").
272.
The U.N. Mediation Support Unit operates within the U.N. Department of
Political Affairs and manages the U.N. Standby Team of Mediation Experts and the
online U.N. Peacemaker tool. United Nations Department of PoliticalAffairs-Mediation
Support, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/mediation-support
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (explaining the purpose of the Mediation Support Unit and its
role within the United Nations organizational hierarchy).
273. About Us, supra note 270 (discussing promotion of peace as the purpose of U.N.
Peacekeeping); Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (discussing
promotion of peace as purpose of U.N. Peacebuilding Commission); United Nations
Department of PoliticalAffairs-MediationSupport, supra note 272 (discussing promotion
of peace as the purpose of U.N. Mediation Support Unit).
274.
Telephone Interview with Necla Tschirgi, Professor, University of San Diego
School of Peace Studies (Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Tschirgi Interview]. This interview
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Furthermore, these entities are often better suited than the
UNSC to understand how to address the peace and security
implications of noninternational armed conflicts. 275 Yet they
suffer from lack of funding, lack of human resources, high
turnover among employees, lack of information, and lack of
UNSC support.27 6 The UNSC, for example, prevented the U.N.
Peacebuilding Commission from taking action to address the
crisis in Guinea-Bissau until after the UNSC issued a
2 77
statement.
This dilemma highlights a structural problem about how
competence and authority are allocated within the U.N. There
are cultural norms within these U.N. bodies that prevent the
flow of information, coordination, and collaborative decisionmaking.278 The flawed relationship that exists between the
UNSC and the other U.N. bodies with expertise in peace and
security is partly due to the identity of the people that inhabit
each group. UNSC officials are typically self-described
27 9
"diplomats" who have expertise in political decision-making.
This skill set was and is essential for negotiating decisions that
280
seek to prevent armed conflict between powerful nations.
However, on their own, diplomats lack the sufficient knowledge
to design and troubleshoot plans for intervening into

was conducted to gather antecdotal information about the UN Peacebuliding Commission.
It is not part of a survey and is not intended to provide empirical support. See also Necla
Tschirgi, Escaping Path Dependency: A Proposed Multi-Tiered Approach for the UN's
Peacebuilding Commission 8-10, 14 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
(observing that competition for
http://cips.uottawa.ca/eng/documents/Tschirgi.pdf
membership in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has resulted in it being "highly
susceptible to member state politics to the extent of disrupting the Commission's work,"

and noting that the PBC's avoidance of "hard" peacebuilding cases renders it vulnerable
to damaged relations with the UNSC). Professor Necla Tschirgi formerly served as inhouse consultant/Senior Policy Advisor with the Peacebuilding Support Office at the
United Nations Secretariat in New York.
275. See Liliana Lyra Jubilut, Towards a New Jus Post Bellum: The United Nations
Peacebuilding Commission and the Improvement of Post-Conflict Efforts and
Accountability, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 26, 29, 32-33 (2011) (observing that the PBC was
created to respond to intrastate conflicts); see also Tschirgi Interview, supranote 274.
276. Tschirgi, supra note 274, at 10-11.
277. See id. (noting that the PBC was barred from taking any action in GuineaBissau for over a year until the country's request was forwarded to the PBC by the
UNSC).
278.

See id.

279. See Jubilut, supra note 275, at 34-35 (describing the makeup of the PBC's
committees and noting that their significant size could lead to slow, inefficient results due
to the reliance on consensus-based decision-making).
280. See About the United Nations Security Council, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) (discussing the UNSC's role in
maintaining peace and security).
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noninternational armed conflicts.281 Such decisions often require
knowledge about long-term peacebuilding, reconciliation,
sanctioning of private companies, and "conflict trade."28 2 To
effectively make decisions about peace and security, the UNSC
needs to be knowledgeable about these and other implications
affecting postconflict peacebuilding work.
This highlights the second implication of deciding for peace.
How decisions are made matters. 28 3 Instead of having the type of
intervention drive the decision-making process, the process of
decision-making should drive choices about how to intervene.
Decisions about whether or not to intervene should be inclusive
of and coordinated with the decisions that will necessarily follow
intervention. 28 4 The Security Council can achieve this by
adopting a model of integrated decision-making. Integrated
decision-making would mean that the Council undertakes a duty
to consult those most knowledgeable and most affected by
decisions about intervention and bring them into the decisionmaking process. 28 5 It would require that the Council take
measures to address the disconnect between decision-making
about intervention and decision-making about postconflict
28 6
peacebuilding through institutional and interpersonal reforms.
To do so, the U.N. system needs to evaluate its present
structural design barriers as well as the institutional cultural
See INT'L PEACE INST., SECURITY COUNCIL ISTANBUL RETREAT: AT THE
281.
CROSSROADS OF PEACEMAKING, PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEBUILDING 2 (2010), available at
("An
http://www.ipinst.org/medialpdf/publications/security-council-retreat-epub.pdf
overarching lesson from the UN's experience in the Balkans is the importance of
recognizing the limitations that political context puts on the Council.").
Tschirgi Interview, supra note 274 (discussing the 2010 and 2011 Security
282.
Council Retreats where Members were introduced to these and other topics by outside
experts, and referencing the PBC strategies for addressing conflicts in Sierra Leone, DRC,
and Guinea-Bissau).
GARY GOERTz, INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DECISION MAKING: A PUNCTUATED
283.
EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 108 (2003) ("[D]ecision-making rules usually are very important in
determining choice."); Koskenniemi, supranote 11, at 456-57 (suggesting that the United
Nations has a bias against unilateral decision-making and advocating the use of collective
decision-making).
INT'L PEACE INST., supra note 281, at 4 (recommending increased coordination
284.
between the UNSC and other U.N. bodies engaged in peace and security work); John C.
Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and Multiple Facets of
Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (2003) (discussing
the importance of integrated decision-making); Slaughter & Ratner, supra note 193, at
413-14 (comparing a limited view that state representatives are the sole decision-makers
to a wider view incorporating anyone affected by international law).
See Spain, supra note 18, at 353-58 (arguing that the Council has a duty to
285.
consult and describing a consultation process that would promote consensus-based
decision-making).
INT'L PEACE INST., supra note 281, at 7 (asserting that peacekeeping and
286.
peacebuilding should be integrated).
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barriers that prevent integrated decision-making from taking
place. 28 7 The UNSC itself has a leadership role to play. The
Council has within its own authority the means to undertake
such reforms. 288 It can, for example, invite other U.N. bodies to
participate in deliberations about intervention through informal
consultations. 28 9 It can encourage the use of informal
consultations with Security Council Members as well as informal
interactive discussions and Arria-formula meetings to which nonCouncil Members may be invited. 2 90 Furthermore, it can delegate
its own decision-making authority to a subsidiary body that is
291
better suited to make decisions on a particular matter.
In today's world, "[p]eace is everyone's responsibility. 2 9 2
Envisioning peace as a public good promotes the understanding
that individuals, in addition to states, have rights and obligations
under international law. Advancements in the substructures of
international law, specifically human rights and international
criminal law, have highlighted the need for and value of individual
accountability. 293 International humanitarian law has successfully
developed a norm of individual accountability over the past two
decades. The prosecutions of Slobodan Milogevi6, Ratko Mladi6,
and Charles Taylor have served as high-profile examples that
individuals are accountable for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 294 The normative focus of these practices is an
emphasis on the direct rights of individuals, which has become an
important discourse among international legal scholars. 29 These

287.
See id. at 3 ("Regional and subregional arrangements need improvement. Deskto-desk cooperation is an encouraging development, but there is a continued problem at the
strategic and political levels.").
288.
Broude, supra note 155, at 120 (noting that the "path of normative integration is
easier to follow when it is chosen by decision-makers, not forced upon them, and so does not
lead to a threatening integration of authority").
289.

SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS Div., UNITED NATIONS, 2011 HIGHLIGHTS OF SECURITY

COUNCIL PRACTICE Annex 2 (2012) (explaining that the UNSC may consult with non-Council
Members on an informal basis).
290.
Id.; see also Working Methods Handbook- 'Arria-formula" Meetings, UNITED
NATIONS

SEC.

COUNCIL,

http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/arriaformula.shtml

(last

visited Feb. 5, 2014) (describing the "common understanding" of the Arria-formula meeting
procedures for maintaining flexibility and informality).
291.

MATHESON, supranote 16, at 26-31.

292.
Pamela Baxter & Vick Ikobwa, Peace Education Programmes: Why and How?,
FORCED MIGRATION REV., Jan. 2005, at 28, 29 (discussing the importance of peace education,
its methodology, and the UNHCR's recent efforts in the DRC and Uganda).
293.
TEITEL, supra note 209, at 7.
294.
International Justice: Infamous
War
Crimes
Cases,
CBC
NEWS,
http://www.cbc.ca/newslworld/international-justice-infamous-war-crimes-cases- 1.773125 (last
updated Apr. 26, 2012).
295.
See 1 David Donat Cattin et al., Europe: Regional Report, in THE PURSUIT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND

2014]

DECIDING TO INTERVENE

changes are also beginning to influence legal rules, norms, and
practices of peacebuilding. 296 Peace promotion must be led from
within but supported from the outside. 297 Close attention must be
paid to how authority, and subsequently accountability, is
distributed. Local communities cannot promote peace if they lack
the authority and resources to do so. Furthermore, people will
not take responsibility for promoting peace if they have had no
say in the vision for peace.
Thus, deciding for peace requires the Security Council to
change its practices. It will need to identify and include into its
decision-making process those who are essential to the process of
deciding how to intervene effectively. 298 The Council will need to
reconsider how it makes decisions and adopt new practices such
as integrated decision-making. Finally, the Council will need to
reevaluate its role in building capacity for nonmilitary forms of
intervention.2 99 Deciding for peace calls for renewed focus given
to how peacekeepers can provide the necessary security within
ongoing hostilities wherein peace talks can occur. 300 Political and
diplomatic interventions that facilitate arrangements for formal
peace agreements and postconflict frameworks such as
disarmament, reconstruction, and reconciliation should be
improved and streamlined. 30 1 Humanitarian aid, both through
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 803, 894-900 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2010) (studying
approaches to international criminal justice, identifying certain criteria for effectiveness,
such as inclusiveness (of victims in particular), and prioritizing elements that will support
long-term resolution, reconciliation, and peacebuilding).
296.
For scholarship addressing post-conflict peacebuilding, see generally Jus POST
BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE (Carsten Stahn &
Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008); Brabandere, supra note 208; Michael J. Matheson, United
Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (2001); Roland Paris,
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 404
(Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007).
297.
Birger Heldt, Peacekeeping and Transitions to Democracy, in BUILDING PEACE,
CREATING CONFLICT?: CONFLICTUAL DIMENSIONS OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING 47, 68-69 (Hanne Fjelde & Kristine Hoglund eds., 2011) (finding that U.N.
Peacekeeping operations appear to have a positive effect on the transition to democracy in
war-torn nations).
298.
Cf. RICHARD SNYDER, HENRY BRUCK & BURTON SAPIN, DECISION-MAKING AS AN
APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1954); Koskenniemi, supra note
11, at 467-68 (finding that "the assumption of a unitary national interest fails to account
for... the contrasting interest of a local population, minority, or women"); Jonathan
Renshon & Stanley A. Renshon, The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision
Making, 29 POL. PSYCHOL. 509, 511 (2008) (arguing that no crisis or war can be
understood "without direct reference to the decision making of individual leaders").
299.
Rogers, supra note 24, at 727-36 (arguing that humanitarian intervention
should be a last resort in achieving peace).
See generally LISE MORJi HOWARD, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS (2008).
300.
See Chen Kertcher, Same Agenda, Different Results: The UN Interventions in
301.
Cambodia and Somalia after the Cold War, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN LOCAL
CONFLICTS 19, 20 (Uzi Rabi ed., 2010); Marvin G. Weinbaum, Lost Faith, Forfeited Trust:
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the influx of financial and in-kind resources, as well as aid
workers who provide necessary medical and other services, must
30 2
become a central priority.
C. MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade
The Security Council's treatment of the armed conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo suggests that the Council is
moving toward a deciding for peace paradigm in several
important ways. On May 28, 2010, the Council issued Resolution
1925, which renamed the earlier United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC),
MONUSCO, to reflect a new mandate. The Council decided to
empower peacekeepers, who are normally restricted to using
force only in self-defense, "to use all necessary means" to protect
"civilians,... humanitarian personnel and human rights
defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence .... [and
to] [s]upport the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo... [in its] [s]tabilization and peace consolidation
[efforts]. '"3° 3 After some success but also renewed cycles of
violence, the Security Council created the "Intervention Brigade"
on March 28, 2013.304 The significance of this resolution is that it

authorized the peacekeeping force to take measures to
"neutralize armed groups." 30 5 The Intervention Brigade's
purpose, in part, is to reduce the threat of violence against
civilians, with a focus on sexual violence against women and
children; establish political stability and effective governance;
and provide support to efforts to establish national and
international judicial processes to prosecute war crimes and
Afghan Responses to Post-9/11 International Intervention in State-Building and
Insurgency, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN LOC.L CONFLICTS, supra, at 222, 223;
Farer, supra note 12, at 329-30.
302.
See RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 55, at 225-27 (providing
Framework Principles for Humanitarian Intervention).
303.
S.C. Res. 1925,
10-12, U.N. Doc S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010).
304.
S.C. Res. 2098, supra note 51,
9-10.
305.
Id.
9 ("Decides to extend the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC until 31
March 2014, takes note of the recommendations of the Special Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the DRC and in the Great Lakes Region regarding MONUSCO, and decides
that MONUSCO shall, for an initial period of one year and within the authorized troop
ceiling of 19,815, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any
prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an 'Intervention Brigade'
consisting inter alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and
Reconnaissance company with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the
MONJSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups as
set out in paragraph 12 (b) below and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat
posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to
make space for stabilization activities .... ").
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crimes against humanity. 30 6 The Council's resolution also
discussed the future, providing a transition whereby the
Intervention Brigade would turn over its responsibilities to a
30 7
Congolese-led Rapid Response Force.
This resolution marks an evolution in the Council's approach
to intervention. It coupled the authorization to use force with
other features necessary for the establishment of long-term peace
and stability. Among these are special protections for women and
children, who face unique risks and consequences during armed
conflict, and support for developing forums for prosecuting
international crimes. 308 The Council's approach to the crisis in
the DRC is comprehensive and robust while reflecting a longterm vision. It reflects operational changes as well. For example,
the Council informed MONUSCO leaders about its concern that
peacekeepers could become active parties to the armed conflict.
Given this, MONUSCO leaders have been careful about the way
they engage armed rebel groups and have remained in 3close
09
consultation with the Council about their ground operations.
By contrast, the Council's decision to authorize the use of
force in Libya lacked these features. 3 10 The Council's resolution
there authorized U.N. Member States to take "all necessary
measures" to protect civilians and "requests" that such states
inform the U.N. Secretary-General of the measures they intend
to take. 3 11 The Council's resolution did not provide the level of
11-12.
Id.
306.
307.
Id. 10.
See generally Beth Van Schaack, Engendering Genocide: The Akayesu Case
308.
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY
STORIES 193 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the importance of and
absence of protection for women and children from sexual violence under international
law).
Interview, supra note 96.
309.
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14; see also Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
310.
State, Address at the 2nd Annual "Live from L" at the George Washington University
School of Law (Feb. 24, 2012). The UNSC took up the matter, with the British circulating
a draft proposal authorizing the creation and enforcement of a no-fly zone as well as
authorizing the protection of civilians. At issue was the question of how the resolution
should specify the terms of enforcement. Unilateral action would not be welcomed and a
NATO-led operation was not politically acceptable. Russia circulated a draft proposal that
removed the authority of civilian protection. Louis Charbonneau, U.S. Joins France and
UK in Urging Swift U.N. Libya Action, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/03/16/us-libya-un-idUSTRE71P26Z20110316; Erwin van Veen, From Spring
into Summer: Key PeacebuildingActions for Libya, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Sept. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/erwin-van-veen/from-spring-into-summer-keysuccessful intervention,
after a
(arguing that
peacebuilding-actions-for-libya
peacebuilding institutions are needed to help transition a post-Gaddafi Libya).
4 ("Authorizes Member States that have
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 14,
311.
notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or
arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all
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detail it did in the case of the DRC about who would intervene,
what type of force could be used, and what would happen in the
long term. Though the intervention into Libya saved the lives of
many civilians, it also resulted in regime change with new
fragmented governance structures that lacked effective control.
Furthermore, former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was not
prosecuted for his alleged criminal acts; he was killed. These
outcomes, intended and unintended, made the Council's
312
authorization of intervention into Libya controversial.
The contrast of these two cases suggests that the Council's
decision in each turn began with the desire to address
humanitarian crisis and prevent loss of civilian life. The
difference in the outcome had much to do with process. In the
case of the DRC, the Council has been in close consultation with
the intervening authority. This approach is more in alignment
with the purpose of promoting long-term peace and, thus,
provides an early example of how the purposive intent decisionmaking approach might function.
VI. CONCLUSION

The purpose of international law remains the promotion of
peace. Although this foundational value has been the bedrock of
the international legal system since its inception, its meaning is
evolving. Promoting peace in the face of genocide, crimes against
humanity, or massive humanitarian crises requires a new
paradigm, one that is focused on building long-term peace.
Though the use of force may remain a necessary tool under
international law, it cannot be the primary tool by which nations
strive to promote peace.
With this view in mind, this Article has sought to examine if
and how international law can guide the Council in order to help

necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on
any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the
Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization
conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council ...")
312.
See, e.g., Chinese President Meets French Counterpart, Saying Force Is No
Solution
to
Libyan
Issue,
XINHUA
(Mar.
30,
2011),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/30/c_13805658.htm; Joshua Foust,
Syria and the Pernicious Consequences of Our Libya Intervention, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/syria-and-the-perniciousconsequences-of-our-libya-interventionl252631/; Zhang Xinyi, Libya Intervention: Driven
by
Oil or Humanitarianism?, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 23,
2011),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7329108.html.
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it improve its decision-making about intervention. This Article
has posited that the very purpose of international -law, which it
has argued in the promotion of peace, provides a unifying basis
for the U.N. Security Council's decisions about intervention.
This perspective reimagines the debate over whether to
intervene as a conversation about the promise and perils of
promoting peace. It also highlights the value of international law,
beyond rules, as a system of embedded values that serve to guide
decision-makers as they engage in purposive, dynamic decisionmaking.
The task of the future is to build capacity for addressing
modern threats to the peace through nonforceful means. When
forceful intervention is undertaken, it must be done with an eye
toward establishing peace in the long term. The Council should
take seriously the work of determining what kinds of
intervention work best in different crises. Intervention by force
may have a place in the future international legal order, but, if
so, deciding to intervene deserves more careful consideration
than has been given in recent decades.

